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arXiv 2110.05643econ.TH
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通过未来回报信息激励努力

Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards

UNSW Business School(新南威尔士大学商学院)

Chang Liu

AI总结:

本文研究了通过未来回报信息激励代理人努力的最优机制,发现委托人的耐心程度决定了动态披露的价值和最优策略结构。

摘要:

本文研究了一个动态委托-代理模型中没有转移的最优激励机制。代理人从事一项具有不确定未来回报的任务,可以随时退出。委托人知道回报并随时间提供信息以激励努力。我们提供了一个统一的框架,并推导出在平稳和非平稳环境中最优信息政策的闭式解。在此框架内,我们识别出两个精确条件,每个条件都保证动态披露严格具有价值。首先,如果委托人比代理人更不耐烦,她更倾向于由动态披露引起的提前努力安排;在平稳环境中,动态披露有益当且仅当委托人更不耐烦。其次,在没有披露的情况下代理人会随着时间变得悲观的环境中,动态信息提供可以抵消这种下行趋势并鼓励更长时间的努力。值得注意的是,耐心仍然是最优策略结构的关键决定因素。

英文摘要:

This paper studies the optimal mechanism to motivate effort in a dynamic principal-agent model without transfers. An agent is engaged in a task with uncertain future rewards and can quit at any time. The principal knows the reward and provides information over time to motivate effort. We provide a unified framework and derive the optimal information policy in closed form across stationary and nonstationary environments. Within this framework, we identify two precise conditions, each of which guarantees that dynamic disclosure is strictly valuable. First, if the principal is impatient compared to the agent, she prefers the front-loaded effort schedule induced by dynamic disclosure; in a stationary environment, dynamic disclosure is beneficial if and only if the principal is less patient. Second, in an environment where the agent would become pessimistic over time absent any disclosure, dynamic information provision can counteract this downward trend and encourage longer effort. Notably, patience remains a crucial determinant of the structure of the optimal policy.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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