隐性激励提供与学习偏差
Implicit Incentive Provision with Misspecified Learning
AI总结:
本文研究了在委托代理关系中存在偏差的学习,分析了评估偏差如何影响努力生产率和努力选择,并探讨了政策干预对评估的影响。
摘要:
我们研究了在委托代理关系中存在偏差的贝叶斯学习。代理人被评估者评估并由市场奖励。代理人的结果取决于他们的天赋能力、成本性努力——其有效性由生产率参数决定——以及噪声。市场通过观察到的结果推断代理人的能力并据此奖励他们。评估者进行成本高昂的评估以减少结果噪声,这影响了市场的推断并提供了隐性激励。社会——包括评估者和市场——对能力持有固执的不准确信念,这扭曲了关于努力生产率和努力选择的学习。这反过来又影响评估者对评估的选择。我们描述了一个反馈回路,将错误的能力、有偏的学习关于努力和扭曲的评估联系起来。我们描述了在稳定稳态中出现的结果,并分析了它们的稳健比较静态和学习基础。对教育和劳动力市场的应用揭示了刻板印象如何在不同领域之间强化——有时伪装成缩小甚至反转结果差距,并展示了针对评估的政策干预如何有所帮助。
英文摘要:
We study misspecified Bayesian learning in principal-agent relationships, where an agent is assessed by an evaluator and rewarded by the market. The agent's outcome depends on their innate ability, costly effort -- whose effectiveness is governed by a productivity parameter -- and noise. The market infers the agent's ability from observed outcomes and rewards them accordingly. The evaluator conducts costly assessments to reduce outcome noise, which shape the market's inferences and provide implicit incentives for effort. Society -- including the evaluator and the market -- holds dogmatic, inaccurate beliefs about ability, which distort learning about effort productivity and effort choice. This, in turn, shapes the evaluator's choice of assessment. We describe a feedback loop linking misspecified ability, biased learning about effort, and distorted assessment. We characterize outcomes that arise in stable steady states and analyze their robust comparative statics and learning foundations. Applications to education and labor market reveal how stereotypes can reinforce across domains -- sometimes disguised as narrowing or even reversals of outcome gaps -- and how policy interventions targeting assessment can help.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。