无可匹敌的针锋相对作为零决定性策略
Unbeatable Tit-for-Tat as a Zero-Determinant Strategy
摘要：
以牙还牙策略是重复对称二人博弈中模仿对手先前行动的策略。我们证明了以牙还牙策略是一个零决定性的策略，当且仅当阶段博弈是一个潜在博弈时，它单方面地使两个局中人的期望收益相等。由于已知这个条件等价于以牙还牙策略不可战胜的条件，我们的结果表明不可战胜性与零决定性策略的概念之间存在某种联系.
英文摘要：
Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected payoffs of two players, if and only if the stage game is a potential game. Because it has been known that this condition is equivalent to the condition that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is unbeatable, our results suggest some relation between unbeatable property and the concept of zero-determinant strategy.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
