arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2107.01286math.OC
收藏

受非凸双层规划启发的均衡建模与求解方法

Equilibrium modeling and solution approaches inspired by nonconvex bilevel programming

Stuart Harwood, Francisco Trespalacios, Dimitri Papageorgiou, Kevin Furman

AI总结:

本文以非凸双层规划全局优化重构广义 Nash 均衡,提出最小非均衡概念及约束生成/割平面求解算法,可在混合整数参与者情形下找到纯 Nash 均衡。

摘要:

广义 Nash 均衡的求解方法一直由变分不等式和互补问题主导。由于这些方法从根本上依赖于参与者决策问题一阶最优性条件的充分性,因此当参与者由非凸优化问题建模时,它们只能作为启发式方法应用。相比之下,本研究利用非凸双层规划全局优化的理论与方法来处理广义 Nash 均衡。通过这一视角,我们在广义 Nash 均衡、双层规划的可行性、Nikaido–Isoda 函数,以及涉及 Lagrange 对偶和空间价格均衡的经典论证之间建立了精确联系。重要的是,这一切均处于不假设凸性的一般设定下。在此过程中,我们引入最小非均衡作为一种解概念:当均衡存在时,它退化为传统均衡。与双层规划及相关半无限规划的联系,使我们能够将适用于这些问题类别的全局优化方法(例如约束生成或割平面方法)改造用于寻找最小非均衡解。我们提出了一种具体算法,并证明即使参与者由混合整数规划建模,该方法也能找到纯 Nash 均衡。

英文摘要:

Solution methods for generalized Nash equilibrium have been dominated by variational inequalities and complementarity problems. Since these approaches fundamentally rely on the sufficiency of first-order optimality conditions for the players' decision problems, they only apply as heuristic methods when the players are modeled by nonconvex optimization problems. In contrast, this work approaches generalized Nash equilibrium using theory and methods for the global optimization of nonconvex bilevel programs. Through this perspective, we draw precise connections between generalized Nash equilibria, feasibility for bilevel programming, the Nikaido-Isoda function, and classic arguments involving Lagrangian duality and spatial price equilibrium. Significantly, this is all in a general setting without the assumption of convexity. Along the way, we introduce the idea of minimum disequilibrium as a solution concept that reduces to traditional equilibrium when equilibrium exists. The connections with bilevel programming and related semi-infinite programming permit us to adapt global optimization methods for those classes of problems, such as constraint generation or cutting plane methods, to the problem of finding a minimum disequilibrium solution. We propose a specific algorithm and show that this method can find a pure Nash equilibrium even when the players are modeled by mixed-integer programs.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑