In a recent paper (Scheme of the arrangement for attack on the protocol BB84, Optik 127(18):7083-7087, Sept 2016), a protocol was proposed for using weak measurement to attack BB84. This claimed the four basis states typically used could be perfectly discriminated, and so an interceptor could obtain all information carried. We show this attack fails when considered using standard quantum mechanics, as expected - such ``single-shot" quantum state discrimination is impossible, even using weak measurement.
This study points out a semi-quantum protocol for private comparison using Bell states (SQPC) suffering from the double C-NOT attack and the malicious agent attack. The attacker can easily obtain information through these attacks. An improved protocol is proposed, which can effectively resist both of these attacks.
This is a brief comment on the Letter by Balygin and his coworkers [Laser Phys. Lett. 15, 095203 (2018)]. We point out an error that invalidates the Letter's conclusions.
Comment on "A special attack on the multiparty quantum secret sharing of secure direct communication using single photons"
在这篇评论中，我们表明，特殊攻击[S.- J. Qin，F. Gao，Q.- Y. Wen，F.- C. Zhu，Opt. Commun. 281（2008）5472.]，其声称能够通过随机相移操作获得使用单光子的安全直接通信的多方量子秘密共享的协议的所有传输的秘密消息比特值，失败了。此外，一类类似的攻击也被证明是无法提取的秘密消息。
Comment on "Deterministic six states protocol for quantum communication" [Phys. Lett. A 358 (2006) 85]
在[J.S. Shaari，M. Lucamarini，M.R.B. Wahiddin，Phys. Lett. A 358（2006）85-90]已经开发了用于量子通信的确定性六态协议（6DP）。该协议是基于三个相互无偏基地和四个编码算子。信息通过来自不同基地的两个量子比特在用户之间传输。研究了三种攻击：拦截重发攻击（IRA），双重CNOT攻击（2 hocTA）和量子中间人攻击。在这封信中，我们表明IRA和2 hocTA没有得到适当的解决。例如，我们发现，在IRA的控制模式下检测到夏娃的概率是70%，而不是以前的研究中的50%。此外，在2 hocTA中，Eve只能获得50%的数据，而不是前面所说的全部数据。
Comment on "Cryptanalysis and improvement of multiparty quantum secret sharing schemes"
我们表明，使用王等人攻击[T.- y.王，Q.- y. Wen，F. Gao，S. Lin，F.- C. Zhu，Phys. Lett. A 373（2008）65]，在Zhang等人的QSSCM方案[Z.- j. Zhang，G. Gao、X.王湖，澳-地f Han，S.- H. Shi，Opt. Commun. 269（2007）418]。从某种意义上说，Wang等人的攻击对Zhang等人的QSSCM方案是不成功的。
Comment on "Security analysis and improvements of arbitrated quantum signature schemes"
最近，Zou等人[Phys.Rev.A82，042325（2010）]证明了两个仲裁量子签名（AQS）方案是不安全的，因为当接收者否认签名的完整性时，仲裁者不能仲裁两个用户之间的争议。Zou等人利用公共董事会提出了两种AQS方案来解决该问题。这项工作表明，同样的安全问题可能存在于邹等。的阴谋。此外，恶意验证者Bob可以主动否定已签名的订单，如果他愿意的话。这种攻击是在[Phys. Rev. Lett. 91，109801（2003）]在量子密码学中是重要的。Bob可能会从这种DoS攻击中获得一些好处，因为他可以主动拒绝Alice的签名订单而不会被检测到。这项工作还表明，恶意签名者可以透露验证者的秘密密钥，而不会被发现使用木马攻击。
Chau [H. F. Chau，quant-ph/0602099 v3]，声称能够打破所有量子弦密封协议，包括He [G. P. He，Int. J. Quant.通知。4，677（2006）]。在这里，它将表明，在他的协议中获得的信息的攻击是微不足道的。因此，Chau关于所有量子弦密封都是不安全的结论是错误的。这也将表明，一些其他索赔周的文件是不准确的。
Designing a quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol is always a challenging task, because both the security and the fairness properties have to be considered simultaneously. Recently, Zhu et al. (Quantum Inf Process 14(11): 4245-4254) pointed out that Shukla et al.'s QKA protocol (Quantum Inf Process 13(11): 2391-2405) has some security flaws (which lead to the Participant Attack). Moreover, they proposed an improvement to avoid these weaknesses. However this study points out that the improved protocol also suffers from a colluding attack, i.e., two dishonest participants in the protocol can coll…
Comment on "Fault-Tolerate Quantum Private Comparison Based on GHZ States and ECC"
Li等人提出了一种利用GHZ态和纠错码的两方量子保密比较方案。的论文[Int. J. Theor. 52：2818-2815，2013]，其具有容错能力并且可以在非理想场景中执行。然而，本文的研究指出，在一种特殊的攻击下，即两次Hadamard-CNOT攻击，存在一个致命的漏洞。恶意方可以拦截对方的粒子，首先对这些拦截的粒子和自己的粒子分别执行Hadamard运算，然后依次对它们和预先准备的辅助粒子执行两次CNOT运算。结果，通过测量辅助粒子，秘密输入将在不被检测到的情况下被揭示。为了抵抗这种特殊的攻击，提出了一种改进的方法，即在TP向所有参与者发送粒子序列之前应用置换算子。
Recently, Liu et al. (Quantum Inf Process (2014) 13:491-502) proposed an arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme, where a signature receiver (Bob) can verify the signer's signature through the help of a trusted arbitrator. However, this paper shows that a malicious Bob can perform the existential forgery of the signature under the chosen message attack without being detected.
In 2015, Li et al. (Quantum Inf Process (2015) 14:2171-2181) proposed an arbitrated quantum signature (AQS) scheme based on the chained controlled-NOT operations encryption. However, this paper points out that in their scheme an attacker can forge a signature without being detected. Therefore, Li et al.'s AQS scheme cannot satisfy the unforgeability and non-repudiation property.
Comment on "Quantum key distribution via quantum encryption"
在论文[Zhang，Li and Guo，Phys.Rev.A64，024302（2001）]中，提出了一种基于量子加密的量子密钥分发协议，在该协议中，量子密钥可以重用。然而，它表明，如果Eve采用一种特殊的策略来攻击，该协议变得不安全，因为重用的量子密钥。也就是说，夏娃可以在不被发现的情况下引出关于密钥位的部分信息。最后，对Zhang-Li-Guo协议提出了一种可能的改进。
This a response to "Yes They Can! ..." (a comment on [5]) by J.S. Shaari et al. [9]. We show that the claims in the comment do not hold up and that all the conclusions obtained in [5] are correct. In particular, the two considered kinds of two-way communication protocols (ping-pong and LM05) under a quantum-man-in-the-middle (QMM) attack have neither a critical disturbance (D), nor a valid privacy amplification (PA) procedure, nor an unconditional security proof. However, we point out that there is another two-way protocol which does have a critical D and a valid PA and which is resistant to a…
Recently, Wu et al. [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 58, 1854, (2019)] found a serious information leakage problem in Ye and Ji's quantum private comparison protocol [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 56, 1517, (2017)], that is, a malicious participant can steal another's secret data without being detected through an active attack means. In this paper, we show that Wu et al.'s attack means is also effective for several other existing protocols, including the ones proposed by Ji et al. and Zha et al. [Commun. Theor. Phys. 65, 711, (2016) and Int. J. Theor. Phys. 57, 3874, (2018)]. In addition, we propose a passive att…
Hacking Cryptographic Protocols with Advanced Variational Quantum Attacks
Multiverse Computing（多元宇宙计算公司）；Tecnun - University of Navarra（纳瓦拉大学 Tecnun 学院）；Donostia International Physics Center（多诺斯蒂亚国际物理中心）；Ikerbasque Foundation for Science（伊克尔巴斯克科学基金会）
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. Wh…
