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arXiv 2106.06272cs.CR
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安全性与保密性基于模型的联合分析:综述与差距识别

Model-based Joint Analysis of Safety and Security: Survey and Identification of Gaps

Stefano M. Nicoletti, Marijn Peppelman, Christina Kolb, Mariëlle Stoelinga

AI总结:

本文综述了14种安全性与保密性联合分析的模型形式化方法,通过统一案例建模与多维度比较,指出了当前在交互理解、建模构造、权衡指标及大型案例研究方面的研究差距。

摘要:

我们调研了基于模型的安全性与保密性联合分析形式化方法的最新进展,其中安全性指不存在非预期故障,保密性指不存在恶意攻击。我们进行了全面的文献综述,因此考虑了十四种基于模型的形式化方法,并根据以下标准对它们进行了比较:(1) 建模能力与表达能力:这些形式化方法能表达哪些现象?它们能在多大程度上捕捉安全性与保密性的交互作用?(2) 分析能力:支持哪些分析类型?(3) 实际适用性:这些形式化方法在多大程度上被用于分析小型或大型案例研究?此外,(1) 我们针对树状形式化方法中的安全性与保密性依赖关系提出了更精确的定义;(2) 我们通过建模文献中相同的简单示例展示了每种形式化方法的潜力;(3) 我们展示了发现并探讨了缩小突出差距的可能方法。总而言之,我们的主要发现如下:(1) 大多数方法结合了树状形式模型;(2) 安全性与保密性交互的确切性质仍缺乏深入理解;(3) 多样化的形式化方法能捕捉不同的交互;(4) 所分析的形式化方法合并了现有特定于安全性和保密性的形式化方法中的建模构造,而没有引入专门用于建模安全性与保密性交互的特定构造,或(5) 用于分析权衡的指标。此外,(6) 代表安全性与保密性交互的大型案例研究仍然缺失。

英文摘要:

We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and security joint analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures, and security to absence of malicious attacks. We conduct a thorough literature review and - as a result - we consider fourteen model-based formalisms and compare them with respect to several criteria: (1) Modelling capabilities and Expressiveness: which phenomena can be expressed in these formalisms? To which extent can they capture safety-security interactions? (2) Analytical capabilities: which analysis types are supported? (3) Practical applicability: to what extent have the formalisms been used to analyze small or larger case studies? Furthermore, (1) we present more precise definitions for safety-security dependencies in tree-like formalisms; (2) we showcase the potential of each formalism by modelling the same toy example from the literature and (3) we present our findings and reflect on possible ways to narrow highlighted gaps. In summary, our key findings are the following: (1) the majority of approaches combine tree-like formal models; (2) the exact nature of safety-security interaction is still ill-understood and (3) diverse formalisms can capture different interactions; (4) analyzed formalisms merge modelling constructs from existing safety- and security-specific formalisms, without introducing ad hoc constructs to model safety-security interactions, or (5) metrics to analyze trade offs. Moreover, (6) large case studies representing safety-security interactions are still missing.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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