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arXiv 2210.15017cs.CR
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可靠的安全管理

Accountable Safety for Rollups

Ertem Nusret Tas, John Adler, Mustafa Al-Bassam, Ismail Khoffi, David Tse, Nima Vaziri

摘要:

问责制,即可证明地识别协议违反者的能力,作为权益证明(PoS)协议安全性的主要经济论据而变得突出。Rollups是区块链最流行的扩展解决方案,通常使用PoS协议作为其父链。我们定义责任汇总,并提出了一个攻击,显示现有的设计缺乏问责制。我们提供了一个负责任的汇总设计,并证明了它的安全性,无论是传统的“神圣”汇总还是主权汇总,主权汇总是一种建立在懒惰区块链上的新兴替代方案,其任务只是汇总数据的排序和可用性。

英文摘要:

Accountability, the ability to provably identify protocol violators, gained prominence as the main economic argument for the security of proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols. Rollups, the most popular scaling solution for blockchains, typically use PoS protocols as their parent chain. We define accountability for rollups, and present an attack that shows the absence of accountability on existing designs. We provide an accountable rollup design and prove its security, both for the traditional `enshrined' rollups and for sovereign rollups, an emergent alternative built on lazy blockchains, tasked only with ordering and availability of the rollup data.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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