The prophet inequalities problem has received significant study over the past decades and has several applications such as to online auctions. In this paper, we study two variants of the i.i.d. prophet inequalities problem, namely the windowed prophet inequalities problem and the batched prophet inequalities problem. For the windowed prophet inequalities problem, we show that for window size $o(n)$, the optimal competitive ratio is $α\approx 0.745$, the same as in the non-windowed case. In the case where the window size is $n/k$ for some constant $k$, we show that $α_k < WIN_{n/k} \le α_k + o_k(1)$ where $WIN_{n/k}$ is the optimal competitive ratio for the window size $n/k$ prophet inequalities problem and $α_k$ is the optimal competitive ratio for the $k$ sample i.i.d. prophet inequalities problem. Finally, we prove an equivalence between the batched prophet inequalities problem and the i.i.d. prophet inequalities problem.
We investigate non-adaptive algorithms for matroid prophet inequalities. Matroid prophet inequalities have been considered resolved since 2012 when [KW12] introduced thresholds that guarantee a tight 2-approximation to the prophet; however, this algorithm is adaptive. Other approaches of [CHMS10] and [FSZ16] have used non-adaptive thresholds with a feasibility restriction; however, this translates to adaptively changing an item's threshold to infinity when it cannot be taken with respect to the additional feasibility constraint, hence the algorithm is not truly non-adaptive. A major applicatio…
We consider the prophet inequality problem for (not necessarily bipartite) matching problems with independent edge values, under both edge arrivals and vertex arrivals. We show constant-factor prophet inequalities for the case where the online algorithm has only limited access to the value distributions through samples. First, we give a $16$-approximate prophet inequality for matching in general graphs under edge arrivals that uses only a single sample from each value distribution as prior information. Then, for bipartite matching and (one-sided) vertex arrivals, we show an improved bound of $…
We introduce a new decomposition technique for random variables that maps a generic instance of the prophet inequalities problem to a new instance where all but a constant number of variables have a tractable structure that we refer to as $(\varepsilon, δ)$-smallness. Using this technique, we make progress on several outstanding problems in the area: - We show that, even in the case of non-identical distributions, it is possible to achieve (arbitrarily close to) the optimal approximation ratio of $β\approx 0.745$ as long as we are allowed to remove a small constant number of distributions. - W…
Consider a gambler and a prophet who observe a sequence of independent, non-negative numbers. The gambler sees the numbers one-by-one whereas the prophet sees the entire sequence at once. The goal of both is to decide on fractions of each number they want to keep so as to maximize the weighted fractional sum of the numbers chosen. The classic result of Krengel and Sucheston (1977-78) asserts that if both the gambler and the prophet can pick one number, then the gambler can do at least half as well as the prophet. Recently, Kleinberg and Weinberg (2012) have generalized this result to settings …
We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructing price-based online approximation algorithms, a natural extension of threshold algorithms for settings beyond binary selection. Our analysis takes the form of an extension theorem: we derive sufficient conditions on prices when all weights are known in advance, then prove that the resulting approximation guarantees extend directly to stochastic settings. Our framework unifies and simplifies much of the existing lite…
In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler observes a sequence of stochastic rewards $V_1,...,V_n$ and must decide, for each reward $V_i$, whether to keep it and stop the game or to forfeit the reward forever and reveal the next value $V_i$. The gambler's goal is to obtain a constant fraction of the expected reward that the optimal offline algorithm would get. Recently, prophet inequalities have been generalized to settings where the gambler can choose $k$ items, and, more generally, where he can choose any independent set in a matroid. However, all the existing algorithms require the gamb…
We consider prophet inequalities in a setting where agents correspond to both elements in a matroid and vertices in a graph. A set of agents is feasible if they form both an independent set in the matroid and an independent set in the graph. Our main result is an ex-ante 1/(2d+2)-prophet inequality, where d is a graph parameter upper-bounded by the maximum size of an independent set in the neighborhood of any vertex. We establish this result through a framework that sets both dynamic prices for elements in the matroid (using the method of balanced thresholds), and static but discriminatory pri…
In a classical online decision problem, a decision-maker who is trying to maximize her value inspects a sequence of arriving items to learn their values (drawn from known distributions), and decides when to stop the process by taking the current item. The goal is to prove a "prophet inequality": that she can do approximately as well as a prophet with foreknowledge of all the values. In this work, we investigate this problem when the values are allowed to be correlated. Since non-trivial guarantees are impossible for arbitrary correlations, we consider a natural "linear" correlation structure i…
We consider prophet inequalities for XOS and MPH-$k$ combinatorial auctions and give a simplified proof for the existence of static and anonymous item prices which recover the state-of-the-art competitive ratios. Our proofs make use of a linear programming formulation which has a non-negative objective value if there are prices which admit a given competitive ratio $α\geq 1$. Changing our perspective to dual space by an application of strong LP duality, we use an interpretation of the dual variables as probabilities to directly obtain our result. In contrast to previous work, our proofs do not…
We consider prophet inequalities subject to feasibility constraints that are the intersection of $q$ matroids. The best-known algorithms achieve a $Θ(q)$-approximation, even when restricted to instances that are the intersection of $q$ partition matroids, and with i.i.d.~Bernoulli random variables. The previous best-known lower bound is $Θ(\sqrt{q})$ due to a simple construction of [Kleinberg-Weinberg STOC 2012] (which uses i.i.d.~Bernoulli random variables, and writes the construction as the intersection of partition matroids). We establish an improved lower bound of $q^{1/2+Ω(1/\log \log q)}…
Prophet inequalities for rewards maximization are fundamental to optimal stopping theory with extensive applications to mechanism design and online optimization. We study the \emph{cost minimization} counterpart of the classical prophet inequality: a decision maker is facing a sequence of costs $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n$ drawn from known distributions in an online manner and \emph{must} ``stop'' at some point and take the last cost seen. The goal is to compete with a ``prophet'' who can see the realizations of all $X_i$'s upfront and always select the minimum, obtaining a cost of $\mathbb{E}[\min_…
Prophet inequalities and secretary problems have been extensively studied in recent years due to their elegance, connections to online algorithms, stochastic optimization, and mechanism design problems in game theoretic settings. Rubinstein and Singla developed a notion of combinatorial prophet inequalities in order to generalize the standard prophet inequality setting to combinatorial valuation functions such as submodular and subadditive functions. For non-negative submodular functions they demonstrated a constant factor prophet inequality for matroid constraints. Along the way they showed a…
Online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) were proposed by Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen as a generic technique to round a fractional solution in the matroid polytope in an online fashion. It has found applications in several stochastic combinatorial problems where there is a commitment constraint: on seeing the value of a stochastic element, the algorithm has to immediately and irrevocably decide whether to select it while always maintaining an independent set in the matroid. Although OCRSs immediately lead to prophet inequalities, these prophet inequalities are not optimal. Can we inst…
The rich literature on online Bayesian selection problems has long focused on so-called prophet inequalities, which compare the gain of an online algorithm to that of a "prophet" who knows the future. An equally-natural, though significantly less well-studied benchmark is the optimum online algorithm, which may be omnipotent (i.e., computationally-unbounded), but not omniscient. What is the computational complexity of the optimum online? How well can a polynomial-time algorithm approximate it? We study the above questions for the online stochastic maximum-weight matching problem under vertex a…
We introduce a novel framework of Prophet Inequalities for combinatorial valuation functions. For a (non-monotone) submodular objective function over an arbitrary matroid feasibility constraint, we give an $O(1)$-competitive algorithm. For a monotone subadditive objective function over an arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraint, we give an $O(\log n \log^2 r)$-competitive algorithm (where $r$ is the cardinality of the largest feasible subset). Inspired by the proof of our subadditive prophet inequality, we also obtain an $O(\log n \cdot \log^2 r)$-competitive algorithm for the Secreta…
The study of the prophet inequality problem in the limited information regime was initiated by Azar et al. [SODA'14] in the pursuit of prior-independent posted-price mechanisms. As they show, $O(1)$-competitive policies are achievable using only a single sample from the distribution of each agent. A notable portion of their results relies on reducing the design of single-sample prophet inequalities (SSPIs) to that of order-oblivious secretary (OOS) policies. The above reduction comes at the cost of not fully utilizing the available samples. However, to date, this is essentially the only method…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our mechanisms are designed based on a powerful correspondence between two-sided markets and prophet inequalities. They satisfy individual rationality, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, budget-balance constraints and give constant-factor approximations to the optimal social welfare. We improve previous results in several settings: Our main focus is on mat…
Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent observation. The famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the distribution of each random variable can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a "prophet" who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. We generalize this result to the setting in which the gambler and the prophet are allowed to make more than one…
The secretary and the prophet inequality problems are central to the field of Stopping Theory. Recently, there has been a lot of work in generalizing these models to multiple items because of their applications in mechanism design. The most important of these generalizations are to matroids and to combinatorial auctions (extends bipartite matching). Kleinberg-Weinberg \cite{KW-STOC12} and Feldman et al. \cite{feldman2015combinatorial} show that for adversarial arrival order of random variables the optimal prophet inequalities give a $1/2$-approximation. For many settings, however, it's conceiv…
Free order prophet inequalities bound the ratio between the expected value obtained by two parties each selecting a value from a set of independent random variables: a "prophet" who knows the value of each variable and may select the maximum one, and a "gambler" who is free to choose the order in which to observe the values but must select one of them immediately after observing it, without knowing what values will be sampled for the unobserved variables. It is known that the gambler can always ensure an expected payoff at least $0.669\dots$ times as great as that of the prophet. In fact, ther…
Prophet Inequalities and Online Contention Resolution for Matchoids
Georgia Tech, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering（佐治亚理工学院工业与系统工程学院）；University of Chicago, Booth School of Business（芝加哥大学布斯商学院）；Stanford University, Department of Mathematics（斯坦福大学数学系）
The secretary problem or the game of Googol are classic models for online selection problems that have received significant attention in the last five decades. We consider a variant of the problem and explore its connections to data-driven online selection. Specifically, we are given $n$ cards with arbitrary non-negative numbers written on both sides. The cards are randomly placed on $n$ consecutive positions on a table, and for each card, the visible side is also selected at random. The player sees the visible side of all cards and wants to select the card with the maximum hidden value. To th…
Prophet inequalities are performance guarantees for online algorithms (a.k.a. stopping rules) solving the following "hiring problem": a decision maker sequentially inspects candidates whose values are independent random numbers and is asked to hire at most one candidate by selecting it before inspecting the values of future candidates in the sequence. A classic result in optimal stopping theory asserts that there exist stopping rules guaranteeing that the decision maker will hire a candidate whose expected value is at least half as good as the expected value of the candidate hired by a "prophe…
Threshold Dynamics and Correlated Prophet Inequalities
Universidad de Chile（智利大学）；TNG Technology Consulting（TNG技术咨询）；Moroccan Center for Game Theory, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique（摩洛哥博弈论中心，穆罕默德六世polytechnique大学）；Center for Mathematical Modeling & Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California（南加州大学数学建模中心与计算机科学系）；Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Cologne（科隆大学数学与计算机科学系）；Institute for Mathematical and Computational Engineering, and Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile（天主教智利大学数学与计算工程研究所及工业与系统工程系）
A central object in optimal stopping theory is the single-choice prophet inequality for independent, identically distributed random variables: Given a sequence of random variables $X_1,\dots,X_n$ drawn independently from a distribution $F$, the goal is to choose a stopping time $τ$ so as to maximize $α$ such that for all distributions $F$ we have $\mathbb{E}[X_τ] \geq α\cdot \mathbb{E}[\max_tX_t]$. What makes this problem challenging is that the decision whether $τ=t$ may only depend on the values of the random variables $X_1,\dots,X_t$ and on the distribution $F$. For quite some time the best…
Prophet inequalities compare the expected performance of an online algorithm for a stochastic optimization problem to the expected optimal solution in hindsight. They are a major alternative to classic worst-case competitive analysis, of particular importance in the design and analysis of simple (posted-price) incentive compatible mechanisms with provable approximation guarantees. A central open problem in this area concerns subadditive combinatorial auctions. Here $n$ agents with subadditive valuation functions compete for the assignment of $m$ items. The goal is to find an allocation of the …
SKLMS, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院）；School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences（中国科学院大学数学科学学院）；School of Mathematical Sciences, Key Laboratory of MEA (Ministry of Education), Shanghai Key Laboratory of PMMP, Nantong Institute for Applied Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, East China Normal University（华东师范大学数学科学学院）
Real-world problems such as ad allocation and matching have been extensively studied under the lens of combinatorial optimization. In several applications, uncertainty in the input appears naturally and this has led to the study of online stochastic optimization models for such problems. For the offline case, these constrained combinatorial optimization problems have been extensively studied, and Contention Resolution Schemes (CRSs), introduced by Chekuri, Vondrák, and Zenklusen, have emerged in recent years as a general framework to obtaining a solution. The idea behind a CRS is to first obta…
