平台中介竞争
Platform-Mediated Competition
摘要:
双边平台市场中的跨集团外部性和网络效应塑造了市场结构和竞争政策,是广泛研究的主题。较少被理解的是当平台设计多对多匹配时出现的组内外部性:与代理$j$匹配的代理$i$的价值可能取决于与$j$匹配的代理的集合。这些影响存在于企业为争取个人的习惯或注意力而竞争的各种环境中。我的特点平台最优匹配的一般模型,多对多匹配组内的外部性。我证明了一组比较静态分析结果的最佳匹配,并显示这些可以用来分析福利效应的各种变化,包括垂直整合的平台,横向兼并公司之间的市场的一边,并在平台的信息结构的变化。然后,我将在两个深入的应用中探讨市场结构和监管。第一种是公司之间在亚马逊等零售平台上的垄断竞争。第二种是多频道视频节目分销商(MVPD),与电视频道谈判转让费用,并将其捆绑销售给个人。
英文摘要:
Cross-group externalities and network effects in two-sided platform markets shape market structure and competition policy, and are the subject of extensive study. Less understood are the within-group externalities that arise when the platform designs many-to-many matchings: the value to agent $i$ of matching with agent $j$ may depend on the set of agents with which $j$ is matched. These effects are present in a wide range of settings in which firms compete for individuals' custom or attention. I characterize platform-optimal matchings in a general model of many-to-many matching with within-group externalities. I prove a set of comparative statics results for optimal matchings, and show how these can be used to analyze the welfare effects various changes, including vertical integration by the platform, horizontal mergers between firms on one side of the market, and changes in the platform's information structure. I then explore market structure and regulation in two in-depth applications. The first is monopolistic competition between firms on a retail platform such as Amazon. The second is a multi-channel video program distributor (MVPD) negotiating transfer fees with television channels and bundling these to sell to individuals.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。