表演能力
Performative Power
摘要:
我们引入了表现力的概念,它衡量了一家运营算法系统(如数字内容推荐平台)的公司在参与者群体中引起变化的能力。我们将表现力与数字经济中竞争的经济研究联系起来。传统的经济概念难以识别数字平台中的反竞争模式,尤其是由于市场定义的复杂性。相比之下,表现力是一个因果概念,可以通过对市场、其内部结构、参与者、产品或价格的最低限度了解来识别。低表现力意味着公司只能根据当前数据优化其目标。相比之下,高表演能力的公司将受益于引导人们走向更有利可图的行为。我们确认在一个简单的理论模型,垄断最大化表演的权力。一个公司的个性化能力增加了表现力,而竞争和外部选择减少了表现力。在实证方面,我们提出了一种观察性因果设计,以识别数字平台如何显示内容的不连续性中的表现力。这使得我们可以重新利用关于数字平台的各种研究中的因果效应,作为表现力的下限。最后,我们推测了表演力量在数字市场的竞争政策和反垄断执法中可能发挥的作用。
英文摘要:
We introduce the notion of performative power, which measures the ability of a firm operating an algorithmic system, such as a digital content recommendation platform, to cause change in a population of participants. We relate performative power to the economic study of competition in digital economies. Traditional economic concepts struggle with identifying anti-competitive patterns in digital platforms not least due to the complexity of market definition. In contrast, performative power is a causal notion that is identifiable with minimal knowledge of the market, its internals, participants, products, or prices. Low performative power implies that a firm can do no better than to optimize their objective on current data. In contrast, firms of high performative power stand to benefit from steering the population towards more profitable behavior. We confirm in a simple theoretical model that monopolies maximize performative power. A firm's ability to personalize increases performative power, while competition and outside options decrease performative power. On the empirical side, we propose an observational causal design to identify performative power from discontinuities in how digital platforms display content. This allows to repurpose causal effects from various studies about digital platforms as lower bounds on performative power. Finally, we speculate about the role that performative power might play in competition policy and antitrust enforcement in digital marketplaces.
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