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arXiv 2402.09697econ.THcs.GT
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关于三层数据市场的研究

On Three-Layer Data Markets

Rice University(莱斯大学);INRIA Paris and University of California, Berkeley(巴黎国家信息与自动化研究所和加利福尼亚大学伯克利分校);Fuqua School of Business, Duke University(杜克大学福奎商学院);Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto(多伦多大学罗特曼管理学院)

Alireza Fallah, Michael I. Jordan, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian

AI总结:

研究三层数据市场的多阶段博弈均衡,发现买方估值和平台成本影响用户数据共享行为,竞争加剧利于买方和整体福利,提出针对不同成本平台的差异化监管策略以提升用户效用。

摘要:

我们研究了一个由用户(数据所有者)、平台和数据买方组成的三层数据市场。每个用户通过提供数据换取平台服务,当他们的数据(即使是经过加噪处理的)被共享给买方时,会遭受隐私损失。用户选择共享数据的平台,平台在向买方出售数据前决定数据噪声水平和定价,买方选择购买数据的平台。我们通过多阶段博弈对这些交互进行建模,重点关注子博弈纳什均衡。我们发现,当买方对用户数据估值较高(且平台能收取高价)时,所有平台都会向用户提供服务,而用户会加入并向每个平台共享数据。相反,当买方对用户数据估值较低时,只有服务成本低的大型平台能够负担服务用户的成本,此时用户仅加入并向这些低成本平台共享数据。有趣的是,竞争加剧对买方有利而非用户:随着平台数量增加,用户效用不一定提高,但买方效用会改善,不过竞争加剧会提升整体功利主义福利。基于分析,我们进一步研究了提升用户效用的监管措施,发现仅当所有平台均为低成本时,禁止数据共享才能最大化用户效用;在高低成本平台混合的市场中,用户更偏好最低噪声要求而非共享禁令;对高成本平台实施该要求、对低成本平台禁止共享能进一步提升用户效用。

英文摘要:

We study a three-layer data market comprising users (data owners), platforms, and a data buyer. Each user benefits from platform services in exchange for data, incurring privacy loss when their data, albeit noisily, is shared with the buyer. The user chooses platforms to share data with, while platforms decide on data noise levels and pricing before selling to the buyer. The buyer selects platforms to purchase data from. We model these interactions via a multi-stage game, focusing on the subgame Nash equilibrium. We find that when the buyer places a high value on user data (and platforms can command high prices), all platforms offer services to the user who joins and shares data with every platform. Conversely, when the buyer's valuation of user data is low, only large platforms with low service costs can afford to serve users. In this scenario, users exclusively join and share data with these low-cost platforms. Interestingly, increased competition benefits the buyer, not the user: as the number of platforms increases, the user utility does not necessarily improve while the buyer utility improves. However, increasing the competition improves the overall utilitarian welfare. Building on our analysis, we then study regulations to improve the user utility. We discover that banning data sharing maximizes user utility only when all platforms are low-cost. In mixed markets of high- and low-cost platforms, users prefer a minimum noise mandate over a sharing ban. Imposing this mandate on high-cost platforms and banning data sharing for low-cost ones further enhances user utility.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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