This paper studies an $N$-coalition non-cooperative game problem, where the players in the same coalition cooperatively minimize the sum of their local cost functions under a directed communication graph, while collectively acting as a virtual player to play a non-cooperative game with other coalitions. Moreover, it is assumed that the players have no access to the explicit functional form but only the function value of their local costs. To solve the problem, a discrete-time gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeking strategy, based on the gradient tracking method, is proposed. Specifically, a gradient estimator is developed locally based on Gaussian smoothing to estimate the partial gradients, and a gradient tracker is constructed locally to trace the average sum of the partial gradients among the players within the coalition. With a sufficiently small constant step-size, we show that all players' actions approximately converge to the Nash equilibrium at a geometric rate under a strongly monotone game mapping condition. Numerical simulations are conducted to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is introduced to describe the interactions among the agents in each coalition. 2. The Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is designed with the interference graphs considered. The convergence property of the proposed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is analytically investigated. It is shown that the agents' actions generated by the proposed method converge to a neig…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a class of networked games among multiple coalitions where each coalition contains multiple agents that cooperate to minimize the sum of their costs, subject to the demand of reaching an agreement on their state values. Furthermore, the underlying network topology among the agents does not need to be balanced. To achieve the goal of NE seeking within such a con…
In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all the constraints. A finite-time average consensus-based approach is proposed by using full decision information. It is proven that the algorithm converges to a GNE (specifically, a variational equilibrium) of the game. Then, based on the finite-time consensus tracking, we propose a distributed algorithm by using partial decision information only, where only ne…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is applicable to games with constrained strategy sets and weight-balanced communication graphs. We obtain an exponential convergence of the proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of our methods.
In this paper, Nash equilibrium seeking among a network of players is considered. Different from many existing works on Nash equilibrium seeking in non-cooperative games, the players considered in this paper cannot directly observe the actions of the players who are not their neighbors. Instead, the players are supposed to be capable of communicating with each other via an undirected and connected communication graph. By a synthesis of a leader-following consensus protocol and the gradient play, a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategy is proposed for the non-cooperative games. Analytic…
Continuous-time gradient-based Nash equilibrium seeking algorithms enjoy a passivity property under a suitable monotonicity assumption. This feature has been exploited to design distributed algorithms that converge to Nash equilibria and use local information only. We further exploit the passivity property to interconnect the algorithms with distributed averaging integral controllers that tune on-line the weights of the communication graph. The main advantage is to guarantee convergence to a Nash equilibrium without requiring a strong coupling condition on the algebraic connectivity of the com…
Noticing that physical limitations are ubiquitous in practical engineering systems, this paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for games in systems where the control inputs are bounded. More specifically, first-order integrator-type systems with bounded control inputs are firstly considered and two saturated control strategies are designed to seek for the Nash equilibrium of the game. Then, we further consider the Nash equilibrium seeking problem for games in second-order integrator-type systems. As this problem has rarely been investigated, we firstly propose a centralized seeking strategy…
We design the first fully-distributed algorithm for generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games on a time-varying communication network, under partial-decision information, i.e., the agents have no direct access to the aggregate decision. The algorithm is derived by integrating dynamic tracking into a projected pseudo-gradient algorithm. The convergence analysis relies on the framework of monotone operator splitting and the Krasnosel'skii-Mann fixed-point iteration with errors.
In practical applications, decision-makers with heterogeneous dynamics may be engaged in the same decision-making process. This motivates us to study distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in which players are mixed-order (first- and second-order) integrators influenced by unknown dynamics and external disturbances in this paper. To solve this problem, we employ an adaptive neural network to manage unknown dynamics and disturbances, based on which a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is developed by further adapting concepts from gradient-based optimization and multi-agent …
In this paper, a distributed non-model based seeking algorithm which combines the extremum seeking control (ESC) jointly with learning algorithms is proposed to seek a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) for a class of noncooperative games with coupled equality constraint. The strategy of each agent is restricted by both the coupled inter-agent constraint and local inequality constraints. Thanks to the ESC, it is unnecessary to know the specific expressions of agents' cost functions and local constraints and to know the strategies of other agents for the implementation of the proposed GNE seeki…
This paper considers a distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem, where the players only have partial access to other players' actions, such as their neighbors' actions. Thus, the players are supposed to communicate with each other to estimate other players' actions. To solve the problem, a leader-following consensus gradient-free distributed Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm is proposed. This algorithm utilizes only the measurements of the player's local cost function without the knowledge of its explicit expression or the requirement on its smoothness. Hence, the algorithm is gradient-fr…
The design of Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for games in which the involved players are of second-order integrator-type dynamics is investigated in this paper. Noticing that velocity signals are usually noisy or not available for feedback control in practical engineering systems, this paper supposes that the velocity signals are not accessible for the players. To deal with the absence of velocity measurements, two estimators are designed, based on which Nash equilibrium seeking strategies are constructed. The first strategy is established by employing an observer, which has the same orde…
In this work, we study the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for monotone generalized noncooperative games with set constraints and shared affine inequality constraints. A distributed regularized penalty method is proposed. The idea is to use a differentiable penalty function with a time-varying penalty parameter to deal with the inequality constraints. A time-varying regularization term is used to deal with the ill-poseness caused by the monotonicity assumption and the time-varying penalty term. The asymptotic convergence to the least-norm variational equilibrium of the game is pro…
This paper explores distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for games in which the players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their control inputs constrained within a pre-specified region. A linear transformation for the players' dynamics is firstly utilized to facilitate the design of bounded control inputs incorporating multiple saturation functions. By introducing consensus protocols with adaptive and time-varying gains, the unknown actions for players are distributively estimated. The…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in uncertain networked systems without a prior knowledge about control directions is explored in this paper. More specifically, the dynamics of the players are supposed to be first-order or second-order systems in which the control directions are unknown and there are parametric uncertainties. To achieve Nash equilibrium seeking in a distributed way, Nussbaum function based strategies are proposed through separately designing an optimization module and a state regulation module. The optimization module generates a reference trajectory, that can se…
Multi-time scale techniques, such as singular perturbations and averaging theory, have played an essential role in the development of distributed Nash equilibrium-seeking algorithms for network systems. Such techniques intrinsically rely on the uniform asymptotic stability properties of the dynamics that evolve in each time scale of the closed-loop system. When such properties are absent, synthesizing multi-time scale Nash equilibrium-seeking algorithms is more challenging and requires additional regularization mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate the synthesis and analysis of these mecha…
In this paper, we aim to develop distributed continuous-time algorithms over directed graphs to seek the Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game. Motivated by the recent consensus-based designs, we present a distributed algorithm with a proportional gain for weight-balanced directed graphs. By further embedding a distributed estimator of the left eigenvector associated with zero eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian, we extend it to the case with arbitrary strongly connected directed graphs having possible unbalanced weights. In both cases, the Nash equilibrium is proven to be exactly reached wi…
This work investigates a problem of simultaneous global cost minimization and Nash equilibrium seeking, which commonly exists in $N$-cluster non-cooperative games. Specifically, the agents in the same cluster collaborate to minimize a global cost function, being a summation of their individual cost functions, and jointly play a non-cooperative game with other clusters as players. For the problem settings, we suppose that the explicit analytical expressions of the agents' local cost functions are unknown, but the function values can be measured. We propose a gradient-free Nash equilibrium seeki…
We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems with expected valued cost functions whose pseudogradient satisfies restricted monotonicity properties which hold only with respect to the solution. We propose a forward-backward algorithm and prove its convergence under restricted strong monotonicity, restricted strict monotonicity and restricted cocoercivity of the pseudogradient mapping. To approximate the expected value, we use either a finite number of samples and a vanishing step size or an increasing number of samples with a constant step. Numerical simulations show that our proposed algorith…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their opponents and the communication graph is not necessarily the same as the players' cost dependency graph. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within the framework of inexact-ADMM, based on local information exchange between the players. We prove its convergence to Nash equilibrium for fixed step-sizes and analyze its convergence rate. Numerical simulations …
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem, we propose a distributed algorithm based on projected dynamics and non-smooth tracking dynamics, even for the case when the interaction topology of the multi-agent network is time-varying. Moreover, we prove the convergence of the non-smooth algorithm for the distributed game by taking advantage of its special structure and also combining the techniques of t…
This paper investigates the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for two-network zero-sum games with set constraints, where the two networks have the opposite nonsmooth cost functions. The interaction of the agents in each network is characterized by an unbalanced directed graph. We are particularly interested in the case that the local cost function of each agent in the two networks is unknown in this paper. We first construct the stochastic subgradient-free two-variable oracles based on the measurements of the local cost functions. Instead of using subgradients of the local cost func…
This paper aims to accommodate games in which the players' dynamics are subject to un-modeled and disturbance terms. The un-modeled and disturbance terms are regarded as extended states for which observers are designed to estimate them. Compensating the players' dynamics with the observed values, the control laws are designed to achieve the robust seeking of the Nash equilibrium for networked games. Firstly, we consider the case in which the players' dynamics are subject to bounded disturbances only. In this case, the seeking strategy is developed by employing a smooth observer based on the Pr…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper bounded by a positive constant that is independent of the initial conditions of the players, and which can be prescribed a priori by the system designer. The dynamics are model-free, in the sense that the mathematical forms of the cost functions of the players are unknown. Instead, in order to update its own action, each player needs to have access only to real-…
We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. We focus on semi-decentralized communication architectures, where there is a central coordinator able to gather and broadcast signals of aggregative nature to the agents. By exploiting the framework of monotone operator theory and operator splitting, we first critically review the most relevant available algorithms and then design two novel schemes: (i) a single-layer, fixed-step algorithm with convergence guarantee for general (non cocoercive, non-…
We study distributed algorithms for seeking a Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative convex games with strongly monotone mappings. Each player has access to her own smooth local cost function and can communicate to her neighbors in some undirected graph. To deal with fast distributed learning of Nash equilibria under such settings, we introduce a so called augmented game mapping and provide conditions under which this mapping is strongly monotone. We consider a distributed gradient play algorithm for determining a Nash equilibrium (GRANE). The algorithm involves every player performing…
This paper studies a significant problem in green networking called switching off base stations in case of cooperating service providers by means of stochastic geometric and coalitional game tools. The coalitional game herein considered is played by service providers who cooperate in switching off base stations. When they cooperate, any mobile is associated to the nearest BS of any service provider. Given a Poisson point process deployment model of nodes over an area and switching off base stations with some probability, it is proved that the distribution of signal to interference plus noise r…
This paper considers the design of fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for multi-agent games. To develop fully distributed seeking strategies, two adaptive control laws, including a node-based control law and an edge-based control law, are proposed. In the node-based adaptive strategy, each player adjusts their own weight on their procurable consensus error dynamically. Moreover, in the edge-based algorithm, the fully distributed strategy is designed by adjusting the weights on the edges of the communication graph adaptively. By utilizing LaSalle's invariance principle, it is…
This paper aims at investigating the problem of fast convergence to the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-Player noncooperative differential games. The proposed method is such that the players attain their NE point without steady-state oscillation (SSO) by measuring only their payoff values with no information about payoff functions, the model and also the actions of other players are not required for the players. The proposed method is based on an extremum seeking (ES) method, and moreover, compared to the traditional ES approaches, in the presented algorithm, the players can accomplish their NE fa…
In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action set. The action sets of all players are coupled through a shared convex inequality constraint. Each player can only have access to its own cost function, its own set constraint and a local block of the inequality constraint, and can only communicate with its neighbours via a connected graph. Moreover, players do not have prior knowledge of their future cost fun…
This paper considers the privacy-preserving Nash equilibrium seeking strategy design for a class of networked aggregative games, in which the players' objective functions are considered to be sensitive information to be protected. In particular, we consider that the networked game is free of central node and the aggregate information is not directly available to the players. As there is no central authority to provide the aggregate information required by each player to update their actions, a dynamic average consensus protocol is employed to estimate it. To protect the players' privacy, we pe…
This paper considers the distributed strategy design for Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in multi-cluster games under a partial-decision information scenario. In the considered game, there are multiple clusters and each cluster consists of a group of agents. A cluster is viewed as a virtual noncooperative player that aims to minimize its local payoff function and the agents in a cluster are the actual players that cooperate within the cluster to optimize the payoff function of the cluster through communication via a connected graph. In our setting, agents have only partial-decision information, …
In this paper we propose a new operator splitting algorithm for distributed Nash equilibrium seeking under stochastic uncertainty, featuring relaxation and inertial effects. Our work is inspired by recent deterministic operator splitting methods, designed for solving structured monotone inclusion problems. The algorithm is derived from a forward-backward-forward scheme for solving structured monotone inclusion problems featuring a Lipschitz continuous and monotone game operator. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first distributed (generalized) Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm featuri…
This paper investigates Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems for noncooperative games over multi-players networks with finite bandwidth communication. A distributed quantized algorithm is presented, which consists of local gradient play, distributed decision estimating, and adaptive quantization. Exponential convergence of the algorithm is established, and a relationship between the convergence rate and the bandwidth is quantitatively analyzed. Finally, a simulation of an energy consumption game is presented to validate the proposed results.
Distributed optimization and Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems have drawn much attention in the control community recently. This paper studies a class of non-cooperative games, known as N-cluster game, which subsumes both cooperative and non-cooperative nature among multiple agents in the two problems: solving distributed optimization problem within the cluster, while playing a non-cooperative game across the clusters. Moreover, we consider a partial-decision information game setup, i.e., the agents do not have direct access to other agents' decisions, and hence need to communicate with e…
This paper investigates the equilibrium convergence properties of a proposed algorithm for potential games with continuous strategy spaces in the presence of feedback delays, a main challenge in multi-agent systems that compromises the performance of various optimization schemes. The proposed algorithm is built upon an improved version of the accelerated gradient descent method. We extend it to a decentralized multi-agent scenario and equip it with a delayed feedback utilization scheme. By appropriately tuning the step sizes and studying the interplay between delay functions and step sizes, we…
In this paper we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) via zeroth-order feedback information in games with merely monotone pseudogradient mapping. Based on hybrid system theory, we propose a novel extremum seeking algorithm which converges to the set of Nash equilibria in a semi-global practical sense. Finally, we present two simulation examples. The first shows that the standard extremum seeking algorithm fails, while ours succeeds in reaching NE. In the second, we simulate an allocation problem with fixed demand.
We consider a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) for a network of players. Each player tries to minimize a local objective function subject to some resource constraints where both the objective functions and the resource constraints depend on other players' decisions. By conducting equivalent transformations on the local optimization problems and introducing network Lagrangian, we recast the GNEP into an operator zero-finding problem. An algorithm is proposed based on the Douglas-Rachford method to distributedly find a solution. The proposed algorithm requires milder conditions compar…
We consider the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) with expected-value cost functions. Inspired by Yi and Pavel (Automatica, 2019), we propose a distributed GNE seeking algorithm based on the preconditioned forward-backward operator splitting for SGNEP, where, at each iteration, the expected value of the pseudogradient is approximated via a number of random samples. As main contribution, we show almost sure convergence of our proposed algorithm if the pseudogradient mapping is restricted (monotone and) cocoercive. For non-generalized SNEPs, we show almost sure convergence …
We investigate asynchronous distributed algorithms with delayed information for seeking generalized Nash equilibrium over multi-agent networks. The considered game model has all players' local decisions coupled with a shared affine constraint. We assume each player can only access its local objective function, local constraint, and a local block matrix of the affine constraint. We first give the algorithm for the case when each agent is able to fully access all other players' decisions. With the help of auxiliary edge variables and edge Laplacian matrix, each player can carry on its local iter…
