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arXiv 2002.12857math.OCq-fin.MF
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限价委托书的均衡模型:平均场博弈的视角

Equilibrium Model of Limit Order Books: A Mean-field Game View

Jin Ma, Eunjung Noh

摘要:

本文研究了一个连续时间的限价订单簿均衡模型,其中流动性动态服从一个强度演化的非局部反射平均场随机微分方程.概括Ma等人的基本思想。(2015),我们认为LOB的边界(例如,最佳要价)是平均场随机控制问题的价值函数,作为流动性提供者之间Bertrand型竞争的限制版本。通过对$N$ -卖方静态Bertrand博弈的详细分析,提出了一个代表性卖方的连续时间限制平均场控制问题。然后,我们验证了动态规划原则(DPP),并表明,价值函数是相应的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman(HJB)方程的黏性解。我们认为,价值函数可以用来获得平衡密度函数的LOB,以下的想法马等。(2015)。

英文摘要:

In this paper we study a continuous time equilibrium model of limit order book (LOB) in which the liquidity dynamics follows a non-local, reflected mean-field stochastic differential equation (SDE) with evolving intensity. Generalizing the basic idea of Ma et al. (2015), we argue that the frontier of the LOB (e.g., the best asking price) is the value function of a mean-field stochastic control problem, as the limiting version of a Bertrand-type competition among the liquidity providers. With a detailed analysis on the $N$-seller static Bertrand game, we formulate a continuous time limiting mean-field control problem of the representative seller. We then validate the dynamic programming principle (DPP), and show that the value function is a viscosity solution of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We argue that the value function can be used to obtain the equilibrium density function of the LOB, following the idea of Ma et al. (2015).

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