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arXiv 1912.04870cs.CR
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V0LTpwn:从软件攻击x86处理器完整性

V0LTpwn: Attacking x86 Processor Integrity from Software

Zijo Kenjar, Tommaso Frassetto, David Gens, Michael Franz, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

摘要:

故障注入攻击在过去已被证明是绕过基于硬件的安全措施的可靠方法,例如加密散列、特权和访问权限实施以及可信执行环境。然而,传统的故障注入攻击需要物理存在,因此在许多现实世界的对手环境中通常被认为是超出范围的。在本文中,我们表明这种假设可能不再是合理的。我们提出了V0LTpwn,一种新的面向硬件,但软件控制的攻击,影响计算的完整性,在几乎任何执行模式的现代x86处理器。据我们所知,这是第一次从软件上攻击x86完整性。我们的攻击背后的关键思想是对物理核心进行欠压,以强制不可恢复的硬件故障。在V0LTpwn攻击下,CPU指令将继续执行错误的结果,而不会崩溃,从而允许利用。与最近提出的利用易受攻击的推测性执行的侧信道攻击相比,V0LTpwn不仅限于信息泄露,还允许对手影响执行,因此有效地破坏了现代x86平台的完整性目标。在我们的详细评估中,我们成功地从特权进程对英特尔SGX安全区发起了基于软件的攻击,以证明V0LTpwn攻击可以成功更改安全区内跨多个CPU版本执行的计算结果。

英文摘要:

Fault-injection attacks have been proven in the past to be a reliable way of bypassing hardware-based security measures, such as cryptographic hashes, privilege and access permission enforcement, and trusted execution environments. However, traditional fault-injection attacks require physical presence, and hence, were often considered out of scope in many real-world adversary settings. In this paper we show this assumption may no longer be justified. We present V0LTpwn, a novel hardware-oriented but software-controlled attack that affects the integrity of computation in virtually any execution mode on modern x86 processors. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first attack on x86 integrity from software. The key idea behind our attack is to undervolt a physical core to force non-recoverable hardware faults. Under a V0LTpwn attack, CPU instructions will continue to execute with erroneous results and without crashes, allowing for exploitation. In contrast to recently presented side-channel attacks that leverage vulnerable speculative execution, V0LTpwn is not limited to information disclosure, but allows adversaries to affect execution, and hence, effectively breaks the integrity goals of modern x86 platforms. In our detailed evaluation we successfully launch software-based attacks against Intel SGX enclaves from a privileged process to demonstrate that a V0LTpwn attack can successfully change the results of computations within enclave execution across multiple CPU revisions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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