arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1902.03676cs.GT
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熵有界的博弈:收敛速度和近似均衡

Playing Games with Bounded Entropy: Convergence Rate and Approximate Equilibria

Mehrdad Valizadeh, Amin Gohari

摘要:

我们考虑零和重复博弈,其中玩家被限制在只需要有限数量的随机性的策略。令$v_n$为$n$阶段游戏的最大-最小值;先前的工作已经表征了$\lim_{n\rightarrow\infty}v_n$,即,长期最大最小值。我们的第一个贡献是研究了$v_n$的收敛速度。为此,我们提供了一种新的工具,用于从另一个源(硬币源)模拟一个源(目标源)。考虑到总变化距离作为精度的度量,该工具提供了模拟精度的上限,该上限在硬币和目标源的Rényi熵的差异中呈指数消失。在第二部分中,我们刻画了所有在长期内达到的近似纳什均衡的集合。事实证明,这个集合与长期最大-最小值密切相关。

英文摘要:

We consider zero-sum repeated games in which the players are restricted to strategies that require only a limited amount of randomness. Let $v_n$ be the max-min value of the $n$ stage game; previous works have characterized $\lim_{n\rightarrow\infty}v_n$, i.e., the long-run max-min value. Our first contribution is to study the convergence rate of $v_n$ to its limit. To this end, we provide a new tool for simulation of a source (target source) from another source (coin source). Considering the total variation distance as the measure of precision, this tool offers an upper bound for the precision of simulation, which is vanishing exponentially in the difference of Rényi entropies of the coin and target sources. In the second part of paper, we characterize the set of all approximate Nash equilibria achieved in long run. It turns out that this set is in close relation with the long-run max-min value.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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