基于激励的需求响应的最优合约设计
Optimal Contract Design for Incentive-Based Demand Response
AI总结：
针对基于激励的需求响应中客户可能夸大基础负荷的问题，将DRA与客户的合约设计建模为管理合约问题，并提出由实测减负荷支付和利润分成构成的最优合约。
摘要：
我们为基于激励的需求响应设计了需求响应聚合商（DRA）与客户之间的最优合约。我们考虑这样一种情境：DRA要求客户减少其用电量，并因这一减少而向客户支付补偿。然而，由于DRA必须按客户的意愿向其供应尽可能多的电力，具有策略性的客户可能会临时提高其基础负荷，从而在需求响应事件中上报更大的减负荷量。DRA希望激励客户既尽最大努力减少负荷，又不虚报基础负荷。我们将DRA为客户设计合约的问题建模为管理合约设计问题，并给出了一种解决方案。最优合约由两部分组成：一部分取决于所测得的（可能被夸大的）负荷减少量，另一部分则将DRA通过需求响应事件获得的利润的一部分分给客户。
英文摘要：
We design an optimal contract between a demand response aggregator (DRA) and a customer for incentive-based demand response. We consider a setting in which the customer is asked to reduce her consumption by the DRA and she is compensated for this reduction. However, since the DRA must supply the customer with as much power as she desires, a strategic customer can temporarily increase her base load to report a larger reduction as a part of the demand response event. The DRA wishes to incentivize the customer both to make the maximal effort in reducing the load and to not falsify the base load. We model the problem of designing the contract by the DRA for the customer as a management contract design problem and present a solution. The optimal contract consists of two parts: a part that depends on (the possibly inflated) load reduction as measured and another that provides a share of the profit that ensues to the DRA through the demand response event to the customer.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
