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arXiv 2604.24344econ.GNmath.OCmath.PRq-fin.EC
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ESG披露的最优激励方案

Optimal incentive scheme for ESG disclosure

CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine–PSL(巴黎第九大学);The Chinese University of Hong Kong(香港中文大学)

Imen Ben Tahar, Dylan Possamaï, Xiaolu Tan

AI总结:

本文研究了在连续时间委托-代理模型中ESG披露的最优激励机制,通过三种工具平衡激励与支付方差,探讨了风险厌恶程度对合同设计的影响,并提出了一种约束二次规划模型。

摘要:

本文characterises最优激励方案用于ESG披露,在连续时间委托-代理设置中。我们建模了一个风险厌恶的委托人(例如平台或标准制定者)与异质代理团队的合约,这些代理的披露信号各自与交易气候风险因子相关。最优合同通过利用三种工具平衡激励提供与总支付方差:自身信号加载、跨代理信号加载以及交易资产的对冲倾斜。我们推导出在可处理的线性二次高斯框架下的闭式线性最优控制。当委托人几乎风险中性时,合同仅用交易资产对冲由高激励产生的特定'执行风险'。随着委托人风险厌恶增加,最优方案收敛到'市场中性'区域,消除总资产暴露并使跨信号结构收紧为'身份池化'约束。我们分析了这一极限作为由M矩阵支配的约束二次规划。在高风险厌恶区域,异质性产生新的效应:S-倾斜截面必须改变符号(除非退化),且当代理行的自身信号对角线可能变为负数,当该行过于暴露于共同交易因子相对于其余群体。结果为再生金融(ReFi)中的'mixed'补偿结构提供了理论基础,解释了稳定支付和波动治理令牌的使用以优化风险分担。

英文摘要:

This paper characterises optimal incentive schemes for ESG disclosure in a continuous-time principal-agent setting. We model a risk-averse principal (e.g., a platform or standard-setter) contracting with a team of heterogeneous agents whose disclosure signals are each correlated with a traded climate risk factor. The optimal contract balances incentive provision against the variance of aggregate payouts by leveraging three instruments: own-signal loading, cross-signal loadings across agents, and hedging tilts on the traded asset. We derive closed-form linear optimal controls in a tractable linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework. When the principal is nearly risk-neutral, the contract uses the traded asset purely to hedge the specific `enforcement risk' generated by high-powered incentives. As the principal's risk aversion increases, the optimal scheme converges to a `market-neutral' regime where aggregate asset exposure is eliminated and the cross-signal structure tightens to an `identity pooling' constraint. We characterise this limit analytically as a constrained quadratic program governed by an M-matrix. In the high-risk-aversion regime, heterogeneity creates genuinely new effects absent under symmetry: the cross-section of S-tilts must change sign (unless degenerate), and an agent's own-signal diagonal can turn negative when that row is too strongly exposed to the common traded factor relative to the rest of the group. The results provide a theoretical foundation for `mixed' compensation structures in Regenerative Finance (ReFi), rationalising the use of both stable payments and volatile governance tokens to optimise risk-sharing.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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