对异质群体的合同设计
Contracting a crowd of heterogeneous agents
AI总结:
本文研究了大规模异质群体的最优合同设计问题,通过线性二次框架分析有限群体和连续极限问题,得到显式的最优合同和均衡努力,并证明了连续合同可以基于大样本评估以获得近似合同,从而在多 agent 交互场景中提供可扩展的近似方法。
摘要:
我们研究了大规模异质群体的最优合同设计问题,其中群体的行为产生网络溢出效应,由交互函数表示。在线性二次框架下,我们解决了有限群体问题及其连续极限,得到显式的最优合同和均衡努力。我们证明连续合同可以基于大样本评估来获得可接受的合同,这些合同在有限群体主导者价值上误差阶为1/N。这为具有许多交互 agent 的设置提供了可扩展的近似方法。我们还证明了对交互函数扰动的稳定性,并提供了比较静态和数值示例,展示了网络位置如何影响努力、激励和主导者价值。结果识别了最优激励应针对那些行为产生更大溢出效应的 agent。
英文摘要:
We study optimal contract design for large populations of heterogeneous agents whose actions generate network spillovers represented by an interaction function. In a linear-quadratic framework, we solve the finite-agent problem and its continuum limit, obtaining explicit optimal contracts and equilibrium efforts. We show that the continuum contract can be evaluated on a large finite sample of agents to obtain admissible contracts that achieve the finite-agent principal's value up to an error of order 1/N. This provides a scalable approximation for settings with many interacting agents. We also prove stability with respect to perturbations of the interaction function and provide comparative statics and numerical examples showing how network position affects effort, incentives, and the principal's value. The results identify how optimal incentives should be targeted toward agents whose actions generate larger spillovers.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。