电动汽车按需代客充电：经济均衡、基础设施规划与监管激励
On-Demand Valet Charging for Electric Vehicles: Economic Equilibrium, Infrastructure Planning and Regulatory Incentives
AI总结：
本文提出按需代客充电商业模式，通过排队网络与经济均衡模型分析代客司机、平台和客户的最优充电站密度差异，并证明对平台征税并投资公共充电设施可抑制垄断、提升社会福利和促进电动汽车普及。
摘要：
许多城市居民由于缺乏专用停车位或电网容量不足，无法安装私人电动汽车（EV）充电桩。这构成了大规模推广电动汽车的重大障碍。为解决这一问题，本文考虑了一种新颖的商业模式——按需代客充电，该模式能够释放未充分利用的公共充电基础设施的潜力，从而有望提高电动汽车的普及率。在所提出的模型中，一个平台招募一支代客司机队伍，在客户与公共充电站之间穿梭，以可负担的价格向电动汽车车主提供按需代客充电服务。代客司机被派往客户处取走低电量的电动汽车，将车辆送至充电站并插上充电枪，然后将充满电的车辆送回给客户。为了刻画所提出的商业模式，我们建立了一个排队网络来表示随机匹配动态，并进一步构建了一个经济均衡模型来捕捉代客司机、客户以及平台的激励。这些模型被用于研究充电基础设施规划和监管干预将如何影响市场结果。首先，我们发现不同利益相关者的最优充电站密度是不同的：代客司机偏好较低的密度；平台偏好较高的密度；而介于两者之间的密度能够实现最高的电动汽车普及率，因为它在前往充电站的行驶时间和在充电站的排队时间之间取得了平衡。其次，我们评估了一项监管政策，该政策对平台征税并将税收收入投资于公共充电基础设施。数值结果表明，这一监管措施能够抑制平台与垄断定价相关的市场势力，提高社会福利，并促进市场扩张。
英文摘要：
Many city residents cannot install their private electric vehicle (EV) chargers due to the lack of dedicated parking spaces or insufficient grid capacity. This presents a significant barrier towards large-scale EV adoption. To address this concern, this paper considers a novel business model, on-demand valet charging, that unlocks the potential of under-utilized public charging infrastructure to promise higher EV penetration. In the proposed model, a platform recruits a fleet of couriers that shuttle between customers and public charging stations to provide on-demand valet charging services to EV owners at an affordable price. Couriers are dispatched to pick up low-battery EVs from customers, deliver the EVs to charging stations, plug them in, and then return the fully-charged EVs to customers. To depict the proposed business model, we develop a queuing network to represent the stochastic matching dynamics, and further formulate an economic equilibrium model to capture the incentives of couriers, customers as well as the platform. These models are used to examine how charging infrastructure planning and regulatory intervention will affect the market outcome. First, we find that the optimal charging station densities for distinct stakeholders are different: couriers prefer a lower density; the platform prefers a higher density; while the density in-between leads to the highest EV penetration as it balances the time traveling to and queuing at charging stations. Second, we evaluate a regulatory policy that imposes a tax on the platform and invests the tax revenue in public charging infrastructure. Numerical results suggest that this regulation can suppress the platform's market power associated with monopoly pricing, increase social welfare, and facilitate the market expansion.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
