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arXiv 1706.08693cs.GT
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网络聚合博弈的灵敏度分析

Sensitivity analysis for network aggregative games

Francesca Parise, Asuman Ozdaglar

摘要:

我们研究了有约束网络聚合博弈的纳什均衡对影响博弈者成本函数的外生参数变化的敏感性。此设置由两个应用程序驱动。第一个是分析干预的社会规划与网络的目标函数,而第二个是网络路由游戏原子球员和信息约束。通过利用变分不等式的灵敏度分析结果的原始重新表述,我们提供了一个只依赖于原始变量的纳什均衡的灵敏度的表征。为了得到这个结果,我们假设强单调的映射与游戏。作为第二个主要结果,我们推导出了保证网络聚合博弈中这种强单调性的充分条件。这两个特征使我们能够系统地研究纳什均衡的变化,由于扰动或参数变化,在上述两个应用程序。

英文摘要:

We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the analysis of interventions by a social planner with a networked objective function while the second is network routing games with atomic players and information constraints. By exploiting a primal reformulation of a sensitivity analysis result for variational inequalities, we provide a characterization of the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium that depends on primal variables only. To derive this result we assume strong monotonicity of the mapping associated with the game. As the second main result, we derive sufficient conditions that guarantee this strong monotonicity property in network aggregative games. These two characterizations allows us to systematically study changes in the Nash equilibrium due to perturbations or parameter variations in the two applications mentioned above.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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