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arXiv 1011.5677cs.GT
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互补动态对策的平均场均衡

Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Complementarities

Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari

摘要:

我们研究一类随机动态博弈,表现出战略互补的球员之间,正式,在我们考虑的游戏中,一个球员的回报有越来越大的差异,她自己的状态和经验分布的其他球员的状态。这种游戏可以用来模拟各种各样的应用程序,包括网络安全模型,推荐系统和市场中的动态搜索。随机博弈通常很难分析,而且只有当参与者的数量很大时,这些困难才会加剧(就像前面的例子中可能出现的情况)。我们考虑一个近似的方法称为平均场均衡来研究这些游戏。在这种均衡中,每个参与者只对其他参与者的长期平均状态做出反应。我们找到了在这种博弈中存在平均场均衡的必要条件。此外,作为这个存在定理的一个简单的推论,我们得到了几个自然单调性性质。我们发现,存在一个“最大”和“最小”的均衡之间的所有这些玩家使用的均衡策略是非递减的,我们还表明,玩家收敛到这些均衡通过自然近视学习动态;正如我们所认为的,这些动态比标准的最佳对策动态更合理。我们还提供了敏感性结果,在那里我们量化了这些游戏的均衡如何响应游戏参数的变化(例如,对球员的激励)。

英文摘要:

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used to model a diverse set of applications, including network security models, recommender systems, and dynamic search in markets. Stochastic games are generally difficult to analyze, and these difficulties are only exacerbated when the number of players is large (as might be the case in the preceding examples). We consider an approximation methodology called mean field equilibrium to study these games. In such an equilibrium, each player reacts to only the long run average state of other players. We find necessary conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games. Furthermore, as a simple consequence of this existence theorem, we obtain several natural monotonicity properties. We show that there exist a "largest" and a "smallest" equilibrium among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is nondecreasing, and we also show that players converge to each of these equilibria via natural myopic learning dynamics; as we argue, these dynamics are more reasonable than the standard best response dynamics. We also provide sensitivity results, where we quantify how the equilibria of such games move in response to changes in parameters of the game (e.g., the introduction of incentives to players).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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