具有互补性的多智能体系统中鲁棒信息设计:最小均衡阈值策略
Robust Information Design for Multi-Agent Systems with Complementarities: Smallest-Equilibrium Threshold Policies
AI总结:
本文提出了一种在具有互补性的多智能体系统中实现鲁棒协调的构造性策略,通过阈值规则实现完美协调,具有可扩展性和高效性。
摘要:
我们研究了在具有二元动作和战略互补性的多智能体系统(MAS)中信息设计问题,其中外部设计者只能通过信号来影响行为。智能体在诱导的贝叶斯博弈中选择最小均衡,反映了一种保守、倾向于协调避免的行为,这在分布式系统中很典型。我们证明,当效用函数具有凸势函数且福利函数是凸的时,鲁棒可实现的最优解具有 remarkably 简单的形式:在每个状态下实现完美协调:要么所有人采取行动,要么没有人采取行动。我们提供了一种构造性的阈值规则:为每个状态计算一个一维分数,按顺序排序状态,并选择一个单一的阈值(对于至多一个状态有刀刃型彩票)。该规则是线性规划(LP)的一个显式最优顶点,由可行性及顺序服从约束所定义。实证上,在疫苗接种和技术采纳领域,我们的构造性策略与LP最优解相匹配,扩展规模为O(|Θ|log|Θ|),并避免了仅假设设计者可以指定(最佳)均衡所预测的福利膨胀。结果是一个通用、可扩展的在具有互补性的MAS中实现鲁棒协调的配方。
英文摘要:
We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian game, reflecting conservative, coordination-averse behavior typical in distributed systems. We show that when utilities admit a convex potential and welfare is convex, the robustly implementable optimum has a remarkably simple form: perfect coordination at each state: either everyone acts or no one does. We provide a constructive threshold rule: compute a one-dimensional score for each state, sort states, and pick a single threshold (with a knife-edge lottery for at most one state). This rule is an explicit optimal vertex of a linear program (LP) characterized by feasibility and sequential obedience constraints. Empirically, in both vaccination and technology-adoption domains, our constructive policy matches LP optima, scales as $O(|Θ|\log|Θ|)$, and avoids the inflated welfare predicted by obedience-only designs that assume the designer can dictate the (best) equilibrium. The result is a general, scalable recipe for robust coordination in MAS with complementarities.
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