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arXiv 1706.01432math.OC
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动态服务率和完全信息下的企业战略均衡

Strategic Equilibria in Queues with Dynamic Service Rate and Full Information

Apostolos Burnetas, Yiannis Dimitrakopoulos

摘要:

研究了服务率受动态控制的单服务台马尔可夫排队的顾客平衡行为问题。客户根据泊松过程到达,并且系统管理员根据$T$阈值动态服务策略在低值和高值之间做出服务速率选择,其中当客户数量超过T时做出切换到更高服务速率的决定,而没有任何附加成本。我们假设,客户是相同的,他们正在联合决策的最大化,他们的预期净收益,获得固定的奖励服务完成,并招致等待成本。此外,我们考虑了可观察的情况下,客户完全了解的服务政策和到达后的队列长度的模型。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice between a low and a high value according to a $T$-threshold dynamic service policy, where the decision for switching to the higher service rate is made when the number of customers exceeds T without any additional cost. We assume that customers are identical and they are making join decisions regarding the maximization of their expected net benefit, receiving a fixed reward for service completion and incurring a waiting cost. In addition, we consider the observable case of the model where customers are fully informed on the service policy and the queue length upon arrival.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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