具有战略互补性的大型寡头垄断均场博弈模型中的多重均衡
Multiple equilibria in mean-field game models for large oligopolies with strategic complementarities
AI总结:
本文研究具有战略互补性的连续时间均场随机博弈,通过格论证明均衡存在性并分析强度参数影响,结合数值迭代方案探讨金融示例中多重均衡与战略互动强度的关系。
摘要:
我们考虑具有战略互补性的连续时间均场随机博弈。代表性生产企业和竞争对手群体之间的互动通过所售商品的价格体现,互动强度由所谓的“强度参数”$ξ$衡量。通过格论论证,我们首先证明了均衡的存在性,并给出了改变$ξ$时的比较静态结果。随后,基于收敛至合适的极大和极小均衡的迭代方案进行数值研究,探讨了在相关金融示例中多重均衡的出现如何与战略互动的强度相关联。
英文摘要:
We consider continuous-time mean-field stochastic games with strategic complementarities. The interaction between the representative productive firm and the population of rivals comes through the price at which the produced good is sold and the intensity of interaction is measured by a so-called "strenght parameter" $ξ$. Via lattice-theoretic arguments we first prove existence of equilibria and provide comparative statics results when varying $ξ$. A careful numerical study based on iterative schemes converging to suitable maximal and minimal equilibria allows then to study in relevant financial examples how the emergence of multiple equilibria is related to the strenght of the strategic interaction.
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