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arXiv 1702.04836quant-ph
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弱测量量子密码

Quantum Cryptography with Weak Measurements

James E. Troupe, Jacob M. Farinholt

摘要:

在这篇文章中,我们提出了一个新的准备和测量量子密钥分发协议,从它的依赖筛选,或以其他方式后选择,检测结果,必要的量子信道误差估计。我们不是从筛选密钥的统计数据中估计夏娃与量子信道的耦合,而是从光子探测器在选择后立即对所有接收到的光子进行的微弱测量中推断出这一信息。我们证明了弱测量参数估计的准确性对合理的设备缺陷是鲁棒的,即使在对抗性环境中,因此可以从BB84的安全性分析中推断出该协议的渐近安全性。除了消除检测器基础相关的攻击,如检测器致盲,我们证明了这种新的准备和测量QKD协议是免疫一类非常强大的测量端设备攻击,也允许对手控制的弱测量结果给出两个适度的要求放在测量端设备。最后,我们比较了弱测量协议的诱饵状态版本的渐近可实现的安全密钥速率,并表明它基本上等于具有诱饵状态的BB84,并且对于实际系统参数,它显著高于MDI-QKD。

英文摘要:

In this article we present a new prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocol that decouples the necessary quantum channel error estimation from its dependency on sifting, or otherwise post-selecting, the detection outcomes. Rather than estimating Eve's coupling to the quantum channel from the statistics of the sifted key, we infer this information from weak measurements made equally on all of the received photons immediately prior to post-selection by the photon detectors. We prove that the accuracy of the weak measurement parameter estimation is robust to reasonable device imperfections, even in an adversarial environment, and hence the asymptotic security of this protocol can be inferred from the security analysis of BB84. In addition to eliminating detector basis-dependent attacks, such as detector blinding, we demonstrate that this new prepared and measure QKD protocol is immune to a very powerful class of measurement-side device attacks that also allow an adversary control of the weak measurement outcomes given two modest requirements placed on the measurement-side devices. Finally, we compare the asymptotically achievable secure key rate of a decoy state version of the weak measurement protocol and show it is essentially equal to that of BB84 with decoy states and significantly higher than MDI-QKD for realistic system parameters.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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