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arXiv 2012.14275quant-ph

量子密码对抗纠缠测量攻击的安全性证明

Security proof for quantum cryptography against entanglement-measurement attack

Zhaoxu Ji, Huanguo Zhang

AI总结:

本文提出利用两种窃听检查方法证明量子密码对抗纠缠测量攻击的安全性,通过最大纠缠态协议演示证明过程。

摘要:

纠缠测量攻击是量子密码学中最为著名的攻击之一。在量子密码协议中,窃听检查是抵抗这种攻击的有效手段。目前有两种常用的窃听检查方法:一种是准备两组非正交的单粒子态作为诱饵态,并通过比较测量得到的态与原始态来判断量子信道中是否存在窃听者;另一种是准备两组非正交的纠缠态,并利用其纠缠关联性来判断量子信道中是否存在窃听者。本文理论证明了量子密码如何利用这两种窃听检查方法来抵抗纠缠测量攻击。我们以基于最大纠缠态的量子密码协议为例,演示证明过程,从基于量子比特的协议过渡到基于量子度的协议。

英文摘要:

Entanglement-measurement attack is one of the most famous attacks against quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography protocols, eavesdropping checking is an effective means to resist this attack. There are currently two commonly used eavesdropping checking methods: one is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal single-particle states as decoy states, and determine whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel by comparing the states obtained by measurements with the original states; The other is to prepare two sets of non-orthogonal entangled states and use their entanglement correlations to judge whether there are eavesdroppers in the quantum channel. In this paper, we theoretically demonstrate how quantum cryptography can utilize these two eavesdropping checking methods to resist entanglement-measurement attacks. We take the quantum cryptography protocols based on maximally entangled states as examples to demonstrate the proof process, transitioning from qubit-based protocols to qudit-based ones.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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