arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1609.00133cs.CR
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dr0wned -网络物理攻击与增材制造

dr0wned - Cyber-Physical Attack with Additive Manufacturing

Sofia Belikovetsky, Mark Yampolskiy, Jinghui Toh, Yuval Elovici

摘要:

增材制造(AM)或3D打印是一种新兴的制造技术,预计将产生深远的社会经济,环境和地缘政治影响。随着这项技术的使用增加,生产功能部件将变得更加普遍,包括安全关键系统的组件。AM对计算机化的依赖引起了人们的担忧,即制造零件的质量可能会受到破坏。本文证明了这种关注的有效性,因为我们提出了涉及AM的第一个完整的攻击链,从旨在损害良性AM组件的网络攻击开始,继续恶意修改制造对象的蓝图,导致破坏制造的功能部件,并导致使用该部件的网络物理系统的物理破坏。本文的主要贡献如下。我们提出了一个系统的方法来识别涉及AM的攻击机会,使对手能够实现他/她的目标。然后,我们提出了一种方法来评估攻击的难度水平,从而使可能的攻击链之间的差异。最后,为了证明整个攻击链的实验证据,我们破坏了一架四轴飞行器无人机的3D打印螺旋桨,导致四轴飞行器从空中坠落。

英文摘要:

Additive manufacturing (AM), or 3D printing, is an emerging manufacturing technology that is expected to have far-reaching socioeconomic, environmental, and geopolitical implications. As use of this technology increases, it will become more common to produce functional parts, including components for safety-critical systems. AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the manufactured part's quality can be compromised by sabotage. This paper demonstrates the validity of this concern, as we present the very first full chain of attack involving AM, beginning with a cyber attack aimed at compromising a benign AM component, continuing with malicious modification of a manufactured object's blueprint, leading to the sabotage of the manufactured functional part, and resulting in the physical destruction of a cyber-physical system that employs this part. The contributions of this paper are as follows. We propose a systematic approach to identify opportunities for an attack involving AM that enables an adversary to achieve his/her goals. Then we propose a methodology to assess the level of difficulty of an attack, thus enabling differentiation between possible attack chains. Finally, to demonstrate the experimental proof for the entire attack chain, we sabotage the 3D printed propeller of a quadcopter UAV, causing the quadcopter to literally fall from the sky.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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