增材制造中基于功耗的破坏攻击检测
Power Consumption-based Detection of Sabotage Attacks in Additive Manufacturing
摘要:
增材制造(AM),又名3D打印越来越多地用于制造安全关键系统的功能部件。增材制造对计算机化的依赖引起了人们的担忧,即增材制造过程可能被篡改,零件的机械性能可能被破坏。这可能导致使用被破坏部分的系统被破坏,造成生命损失、经济损失和声誉损失。为了解决这一威胁,我们提出了一种新的方法来检测破坏攻击。我们的方法是基于在制造过程中持续监测输送到所有执行器的电流,并检测可证明的良性过程的偏差。所提出的方法具有许多优点:(i)它在时间关键的过程中是非侵入性的,(ii)它可以在遗留系统中进行改造,以及(iii)它与AM过程的计算机化组件有气隙,防止同时妥协。在桌面3D打印机上进行的评估可以检测到所有涉及X或Y电机运动修改的攻击,误报率为0%。
英文摘要:
Additive Manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D Printing, is increasingly used to manufacture functional parts of safety-critical systems. AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the AM process can be tampered with, and a part's mechanical properties sabotaged. This can lead to the destruction of a system employing the sabotaged part, causing loss of life, financial damage, and reputation loss. To address this threat, we propose a novel approach for detecting sabotage attacks. Our approach is based on continuous monitoring of the current delivered to all actuators during the manufacturing process and detection of deviations from a provable benign process. The proposed approach has numerous advantages: (i) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process, (ii) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and (iii) it is airgapped from the computerized components of the AM process, preventing simultaneous compromise. Evaluation on a desktop 3D Printer detects all attacks involving a modification of X or Y motor movement, with false positives at 0%.
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