arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1507.00407cs.GTcs.AIcs.LG
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博弈中正则化学习的快速收敛性

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games

Microsoft Research(微软研究院);Princeton University(普林斯顿大学)

Vasilis Syrgkanis, Alekh Agarwal, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire

摘要:

我们表明,自然类的正则化学习算法与近因偏差的形式实现更快的收敛速度,以近似的效率和粗糙的相关均衡多人范式游戏。当游戏中的每个玩家使用我们班的算法时,他们的个人遗憾以$O(T^{-3/4})$衰减,而效用之和则以$O(T^{-1})$收敛到近似最佳值--这是对最坏情况下$O(T^{-1/2})$率的改进。我们展示了一个黑盒减少类中的任何算法,以实现对对手的$\tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$率,同时保持对类中的算法更快的速度。我们的结果扩展了[Rakhlin and Shridharan 2013]和[Daskalakis et al. 2014]的结果,他们只分析了特定算法的两人零和游戏。

英文摘要:

We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in a game uses an algorithm from our class, their individual regret decays at $O(T^{-3/4})$, while the sum of utilities converges to an approximate optimum at $O(T^{-1})$--an improvement upon the worst case $O(T^{-1/2})$ rates. We show a black-box reduction for any algorithm in the class to achieve $\tilde{O}(T^{-1/2})$ rates against an adversary, while maintaining the faster rates against algorithms in the class. Our results extend those of [Rakhlin and Shridharan 2013] and [Daskalakis et al. 2014], who only analyzed two-player zero-sum games for specific algorithms.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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