arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2002.08456cs.GTcs.LGstat.ML
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From Poincaré Recurrence to Convergence in Imperfect Information Games: Finding Equilibrium via Regularization

DeepMind(深度思维);SUTD(新加坡科技设计大学)
Julien Perolat, Remi Munos, Jean-Baptiste Lespiau, Shayegan Omidshafiei, Mark Rowland, Pedro Ortega, Neil Burch, Thomas Anthony, David Balduzzi, Bart De Vylder,… 展开作者

Julien Perolat, Remi Munos, Jean-Baptiste Lespiau, Shayegan Omidshafiei, Mark Rowland, Pedro Ortega, Neil Burch, Thomas Anthony, David Balduzzi, Bart De Vylder, Georgios Piliouras, Marc Lanctot, Karl Tuyls

英文摘要:

In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincaré recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect information games and other sequential game settings. We then investigate how adapting the reward (by adding a regularization term) of the game can give strong convergence guarantees in monotone games. We continue by showing how this reward adaptation technique can be leveraged to build algorithms that converge exactly to the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show how these insights can be directly used to build state-of-the-art model-free algorithms for zero-sum two-player Imperfect Information Games (IIG).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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