arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1504.04768cs.CRcs.LO
收藏

安全协议的偏序约简

Partial Order Reduction for Security Protocols

David Baelde, Stéphanie Delaune, Lucca Hirschi

摘要:

安全协议是使用密码学进行通信的并发进程,目的是实现各种安全属性。最近关于它们的形式化验证的工作带来了用于决定迹等同性的过程和工具(例如,匿名性、不可链接性、投票保密性)。然而,这些程序是基于一个天真的符号探索所考虑的过程中,毫不奇怪,大大限制了验证工具的可扩展性和实际影响的所有痕迹。在本文中,我们克服了这个困难,通过发展偏序约简技术的安全协议的验证。我们提供了减少的过渡系统,最佳地消除冗余的痕迹,这是足够的模型检查跟踪等价性的协议通过符号执行。我们已经在工具Apte中实现了我们的减少,并证明了它在各种协议上实现了预期的加速。

英文摘要:

Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence properties (e.g., anonymity, unlinkability, vote secrecy) for a bounded number of sessions. However, these procedures are based on a naive symbolic exploration of all traces of the considered processes which, unsurprisingly, greatly limits the scalability and practical impact of the verification tools. In this paper, we overcome this difficulty by developing partial order reduction techniques for the verification of security protocols. We provide reduced transition systems that optimally eliminate redundant traces, and which are adequate for model-checking trace equivalence properties of protocols by means of symbolic execution. We have implemented our reductions in the tool Apte, and demonstrated that it achieves the expected speedup on various protocols.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑