关于延期接收算法的敏感性
On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
摘要:
延期录取算法(DAA)是最广泛接受和使用的算法,用于将学生,工人或居民分别与大学,公司或医院相匹配。在本文中,我们认为第一次,操纵DAA的代理,如大学,有能力超过一个的复杂性。对于这样的代理,截断不是一个详尽的策略。我们提出了有效的算法来计算一个操纵的大学时,大学提出或被建议。然后,我们进行了详细的实验的频率可操纵的情况下,以更好地了解双边匹配市场的战略方面。我们的研究结果有些负面的消息:假设代理人有其他代理人的偏好信息,他们不仅经常有动机误报,但存在有效的算法来找到这样的误报。
英文摘要:
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complexity of manipulating DAA by agents such as colleges that have capacity more than one. For such agents, truncation is not an exhaustive strategy. We present efficient algorithms to compute a manipulation for the colleges when the colleges are proposing or being proposed to. We then conduct detailed experiments on the frequency of manipulable instances in order to get better insight into strategic aspects of two-sided matching markets. Our results bear somewhat negative news: assuming that agents have information other agents' preference, they not only often have an incentive to misreport but there exist efficient algorithms to find such a misreport.
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