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arXiv 1404.2750cs.GTcs.SYeess.SYmath.OC
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高效广告分配

Efficient Advert Assignment

University of Cambridge(剑桥大学);Microsoft Research Cambridge(微软研究院剑桥分部);University of Amsterdam(阿姆斯特丹大学)

Frank Kelly, Peter Key, Neil Walton

AI总结:

本文提出一种高效机制,通过分层优化实现大规模广告拍卖的社会福利最大化,利用信息不对称激励真实投标并实现社会最优。

摘要:

我们开发了一个框架,用于分析大规模广告拍卖,其中广告在连续的搜索类型上分配。对于此按点击付费市场,我们提供了一个高效机制,最大化社会福利。具体而言,我们证明社会福利优化可通过在与搜索引擎平台和广告商相关的相关时间尺度上进行单独优化来解决。在此过程中,每次搜索发生时,平台解决一个分配问题,而在较慢的时间尺度上,每个广告商提交投标,将其对点击的市场需求与供应匹配。重要的是,当以这种方式分离问题时,不需要全球参数如搜索术语分布的知识。利用平台和广告商之间的信息不对称,我们描述了一个简单的机制,激励真实投标,并具有唯一的纳什均衡,即社会最优,从而实现我们的分解。此外,我们考虑了广告商随时间平滑调整投标的模型,并证明收敛到最大化社会福利的解决方案。最后,我们描述了几种扩展,说明了我们框架的灵活性和可处理性。

英文摘要:

We develop a framework for the analysis of large-scale Ad-auctions where adverts are assigned over a continuum of search types. For this pay-per-click market, we provide an efficient mechanism that maximizes social welfare. In particular, we show that the social welfare optimization can be solved in separate optimizations conducted on the time-scales relevant to the search platform and advertisers. Here, on each search occurrence, the platform solves an assignment problem and, on a slower time-scale, each advertiser submits a bid which matches its demand for click-throughs with supply. Importantly, knowledge of global parameters, such as the distribution of search terms, is not required when separating the problem in this way. Exploiting the information asymmetry between the platform and advertiser, we describe a simple mechanism which incentivizes truthful bidding and has a unique Nash equilibrium that is socially optimal, and thus implements our decomposition. Further, we consider models where advertisers adapt their bids smoothly over time, and prove convergence to the solution that maximizes social welfare. Finally, we describe several extensions which illustrate the flexibility and tractability of our framework.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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