赞助型问答
Sponsored Question Answering
AI总结：
本文首次形式化分析赞助型问答平台，提出融合自然答案与广告的赞助答案机制，并证明该机制能激励广告主真实出价且具备VCG拍卖的稳定性。
摘要：
从搜索向问答（QA）的潜在转变引发了这样一个问题：从赞助搜索向赞助型问答的转变应如何呈现。我们首次对赞助型问答平台进行了形式化分析。该平台将针对某个问题的自然答案与一则广告融合，生成所谓的“赞助答案”。随后，广告主对其赞助答案进行竞价。受广义第二价格拍卖（GSPs）启发，该问答平台选出获胜广告主，确定其应支付的费用，并向用户展示该赞助答案。我们证明了一系列结果。例如，广告主有动机在竞价中保持真实，即将其出价设定为赞助答案的真实价值。由此形成的机制具有稳定性，并具备VCG拍卖的性质。
英文摘要：
The potential move from search to question answering (QA) ignited the question of how should the move from sponsored search to sponsored QA look like. We present the first formal analysis of a sponsored QA platform. The platform fuses an organic answer to a question with an ad to produce a so called {\em sponsored answer}. Advertisers then bid on their sponsored answers. Inspired by Generalized Second Price Auctions (GSPs), the QA platform selects the winning advertiser, sets the payment she pays, and shows the user the sponsored answer. We prove an array of results. For example, advertisers are incentivized to be truthful in their bids; i.e., set them to their true value of the sponsored answer. The resultant setting is stable with properties of VCG auctions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
