均衡模型中隐私的奇异情形
The Strange Case of Privacy in Equilibrium Models
摘要:
我们研究隐私技术如何影响用户和广告商的行为在一个简单的经济模型的有针对性的广告。在我们的模型中,消费者首先决定是否购买商品,然后广告商选择广告向消费者展示。消费者对商品的价值与她的类型相关,这决定了广告商更愿意向她展示哪个广告-因此,广告商希望使用有关消费者购买决定的信息来定位他展示的广告。在我们的模型中,广告商只得到一个关于消费者行为的差异隐私信号-随着我们改变差分隐私参数,其范围可以从根本没有信号到完美信号。这使我们能够研究均衡行为作为一个功能的隐私提供给消费者。我们表明,这种行为可能非常违反直觉,并且在均衡中添加隐私的效果可能与我们忽略均衡激励时所期望的完全不同。具体而言,我们表明,增加隐私的水平,实际上可以增加的信息量的消费者的类型包含在广告商收到的信号,导致效用降低的消费者,并增加利润的广告商,一般这些数量可以是非单调的,甚至不连续的隐私级别的信号。
英文摘要:
We study how privacy technologies affect user and advertiser behavior in a simple economic model of targeted advertising. In our model, a consumer first decides whether or not to buy a good, and then an advertiser chooses an advertisement to show the consumer. The consumer's value for the good is correlated with her type, which determines which ad the advertiser would prefer to show to her---and hence, the advertiser would like to use information about the consumer's purchase decision to target the ad that he shows. In our model, the advertiser is given only a differentially private signal about the consumer's behavior---which can range from no signal at all to a perfect signal, as we vary the differential privacy parameter. This allows us to study equilibrium behavior as a function of the level of privacy provided to the consumer. We show that this behavior can be highly counter-intuitive, and that the effect of adding privacy in equilibrium can be completely different from what we would expect if we ignored equilibrium incentives. Specifically, we show that increasing the level of privacy can actually increase the amount of information about the consumer's type contained in the signal the advertiser receives, lead to decreased utility for the consumer, and increased profit for the advertiser, and that generally these quantities can be non-monotonic and even discontinuous in the privacy level of the signal.
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