arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1312.6715cs.SInlin.AOphysics.soc-ph
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专家博弈--社会交往中的合作

The expert game -- Cooperation in social communication

Kristian Moss Bendtsen, Florian Uekermann, Jan O. Haerter

摘要:

大部分的专业人际交流都是以请求-回复的方式进行的,请求包含所需信息的细节,而回复可以提供所需的信息。然而,时间限制往往迫使个人优先考虑一些而忽视其他人。这种困境将不可避免地迫使个人背叛一些沟通伙伴,以关注其他人。此外,当个人纯粹自私地行事时,沟通就会完全崩溃,因为永远不会发出回复,并且总是优先考虑寻求所需信息。在这里,我们提出了一个实验,被称为“专家游戏”,其中一些人通过电子消息系统相互沟通。通过对发送信息的数量进行严格限制,个人必须决定是请求对自己有利的信息,还是通过回复他人的请求来帮助他人。在实验中,人们被分配了一项任务,找到某个特定主题的专家,并收到该专家的回复。每个玩家的任务和专业知识被定期重新分配,以随机化所需的互动。为了抵抗这种随机化,个体之间形成了一个非随机的合作通信网络。我们使用一个简单的贝叶斯推理算法来模拟每个球员的信任,在合作的其他良好的实验协议。我们的研究结果表明,人类在群体中的沟通是战略性的,有利于与信任方的合作,而代价是背叛他人。为了建立和维护可信链接,即使在传输的信息可以忽略不计的情况下,也要分配相当大一部分的时间资源。

英文摘要:

Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force individuals to prioritize some while neglecting others. This dilemma will inevitably force individuals into defecting against some communication partners to give attention to others. Furthermore, communication entirely breaks down when individuals act purely egoistically as replies would never be issued and quest for desired information would always be prioritized. Here we present an experiment, termed "The expert game", where a number of individuals communicate with one-another through an electronic messaging system. By imposing a strict limit on the number of sent messages, individuals were required to decide between requesting information that is beneficial for themselves or helping others by replying to their requests. In the experiment, individuals were assigned the task to find the expert on a specific topic and receive a reply from that expert. Tasks and expertise of each player were periodically re-assigned to randomize the required interactions. Resisting this randomization, a non-random network of cooperative communication between individuals formed. We use a simple Bayesian inference algorithm to model each player's trust in the cooperativity of others with good experimental agreement. Our results suggest that human communication in groups of individuals is strategic and favors cooperation with trusted parties at the cost of defection against others. To establish and maintain trusted links a significant fraction of time-resources is allocated, even in situations where the information transmitted is negligible.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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