多元化网络中的战略不一致性对社会困境中的合作起着调节作用
Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks
摘要：
合作是自然和人类系统中一种非常普遍但尚未完全理解的现象。在人口中引入网络是众所周知的影响合作动态的结果，允许在不利的情况下合作的生存。最近，多路网络的引入再次改变了对囚徒困境游戏结果的预期，与单路情况相比。然而，还有很多尚未研究的其他社会困境的多元化，以及未探索的微观基础it.In本文中，我们系统地研究了在所有四个游戏中的$T-S$平面上的多元化的合作的演变。更重要的是，我们发现了一些显着的和以前未知的功能，在微观组织的战略，负责合作动力学之间的重要差异，在单一和多元化。具体来说，我们发现在静止状态下，有一些个体在所有层中都采取相同的策略（连贯性），而其他人则没有（不连贯性）。这第二组的球员是负责一个令人惊讶的事实，非全面合作的和谐游戏的多元化，从来没有观察到，以及高于预期的合作率在某些地区的其他三个社会困境。
英文摘要：
Cooperation is a very common, yet not fully-understood phenomenon in natural and human systems. The introduction of a network within the population is known to affect the outcome of cooperative dynamics, allowing for the survival of cooperation in adverse scenarios. Recently, the introduction of multiplex networks has yet again modified the expectations for the outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, compared to the monoplex case. However, much remains unstudied regarding other social dilemmas on multiplex, as well as the unexplored microscopic underpinnings of it. In this paper, we systematically study the evolution of cooperation in all four games in the $T-S$ plane on multiplex. More importantly, we find some remarkable and previously unknown features in the microscopic organization of the strategies, that are responsible for the important differences between cooperative dynamics in monoplex and multiplex. Specifically, we find that in the stationary state, there are individuals that play the same strategy in all layers (coherent), and others that don't (incoherent). This second group of players is responsible for the surprising fact of a non full-cooperation in the Harmony Game on multiplex, never observed before, as well as a higher-than-expected cooperation rates in some regions of the other three social dilemmas.
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