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arXiv 1302.4595q-fin.RMq-fin.GN
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抵押增强型违约风险

Collateral-Enhanced Default Risk

Chris Kenyon, Andrew Green

摘要:

抵押品的变化与金融危机期间的重大违约(或接近违约)事件有关,最明显的是美国国际集团。我们已经开发了一个框架,量化这种影响的基础上移动之间的默顿型和布莱克-考克斯型结构性违约模型。我们的框架导致了一个单一的方程,它包含了各种可能性,包括抵押品再保证金频率(即离散观测)。我们发现,抵押品的增加,使实体暴露于每日按市值计价的波动,提高违约概率。这量化了众所周知的附带触发因素问题。此外,我们的模型可用于量化中央对手方在消除信用风险传导的同时系统性地增加违约风险的程度。

英文摘要:

Changes in collateralization have been implicated in significant default (or near-default) events during the financial crisis, most notably with AIG. We have developed a framework for quantifying this effect based on moving between Merton-type and Black-Cox-type structural default models. Our framework leads to a single equation that emcompasses the range of possibilities, including collateralization remargining frequency (i.e. discrete observations). We show that increases in collateralization, by exposing entities to daily mark-to-market volatility, enhance default probability. This quantifies the well-known problem with collateral triggers. Furthermore our model can be used to quantify the degree to which central counterparties, whilst removing credit risk transmission, systematically increase default risk.

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