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arXiv 2501.11552econ.GNq-fin.ECq-fin.GNq-fin.PRq-fin.RM
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主权债务违约与气候风险

Sovereign Debt Default and Climate Risk

Emilio Barucci, Daniele Marazzina, Aldo Nassigh

AI总结:

本文研究主权债务违约与气候风险的关系,发现发展中国家应对气候风险激励有限,财政支持比附带条件的重新谈判更有效。

摘要:

我们探讨了主权债务违约/重新谈判与环境因素(例如,土地利用、自然资源开采造成的污染)之间的相互作用。污染增加了自然灾害发生的可能性,并影响经济增长率。国家可以在任何时候对其债务违约,同时决定是否投资于污染治理。该框架提供了对主权债券信用利差的洞察,并解释了观察到的债券利差与国家气候脆弱性之间的关系。通过对发展中国家和低收入国家的校准,我们表明这些国家应对气候风险的激励有限,且债券利差对气候脆弱性的敏感性仍然温和。气候风险在主权债务违约决策中并不发挥重要作用。对气候治理支出的财政支持可以有效促进气候适应行动,而附带污染治理条件的重新谈判则不产生任何效果。

英文摘要:

We explore the interplay between sovereign debt default/renegotiation and environmental factors (e.g., pollution from land use, natural resource exploitation). Pollution contributes to the likelihood of natural disasters and influences economic growth rates. The country can default on its debt at any time while also deciding whether to invest in pollution abatement. The framework provides insights into the credit spreads of sovereign bonds and explains the observed relationship between bond spread and a country's climate vulnerability. Through calibration for developing and low-income countries, we demonstrate that there is limited incentive for these countries to address climate risk, and the sensitivity of bond spreads to climate vulnerability remains modest. Climate risk does not play a relevant role on the decision to default on sovereign debt. Financial support for climate abatement expenditures can effectively foster climate adaptation actions, instead renegotiation conditional upon pollution abatement does not produce any effect.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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