We consider the cheating strategies for the popular matchings problem. The popular matchings problem can be defined as follows: Let G = (A U P, E) be a bipartite graph where A denotes a set of agents, P denotes a set of posts and the edges in E are ranked. Each agent ranks a subset of posts in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. A matching M is popular if there exists no matching M' such that the number of agents that prefer M' to M exceeds the number of agents that prefer M to M'. Consider a centralized market where agents submit their preferences and a central authority matches agents to posts according to the notion of popularity. Since a popular matching need not be unique, we assume that the central authority chooses an arbitrary popular matching. Let a1 be the sole manipulative agent who is aware of the true preference lists of all other agents. The goal of a1 is to falsify her preference list to get better always, that is, to improve the set of posts that she gets matched to as opposed to what she got when she was truthful. We show that the optimal cheating strategy for a single agent to get better always can be computed in O(\sqrt{n}m) time when preference lists are allowed to contain ties and in O(m+n) time when preference lists are all strict. Here n = |A| + |P| and m = |E|.
To compute the cheating strategies, we develop a switching graph characterization of the popular matchings problem involving ties. The switching graph characterization was studied for the case of strict lists by McDermid and Irving (J. Comb. Optim. 2011) and it was open for the case of ties. The switching graph characterization for the case of ties is of independent interest and answers a part of the open questions posed by McDermid and Irving.
In this paper, we consider the Hospital Residents problem (HR) and the Hospital Residents problem with Lower Quotas (HRLQ). In this model with two sided preferences, stability is a well accepted notion of optimality. However, in the presence of lower quotas, a stable and feasible matching need not exist. For the HRLQ problem, our goal therefore is to output a good feasible matching assuming that a feasible matching exists. Computing matchings with minimum number of blocking pairs (MinBP) and minimum number of blocking residents (MinBR) are known to be NP-Complete. The only approximation algori…
Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any matching $N$, the number of vertices that prefer $M$ to $N$ is at least the number that prefer $N$ to $M$. Popular matchings always exist in $G$ since every stable matching is popular. A matching $M$ is $A$-popular if for any matching $N$, the number of agents (i.e., vertices in $A$) that prefer $M$ to $N$ is at least the number of agents that prefer $N$ to…
An input to the Popular Matching problem, in the roommates setting, consists of a graph $G$ and each vertex ranks its neighbors in strict order, known as its preference. In the Popular Matching problem the objective is to test whether there exists a matching $M^\star$ such that there is no matching $M$ where more people are happier with $M$ than with $M^\star$. In this paper we settle the computational complexity of the Popular Matching problem in the roommates setting by showing that the problem is NP-complete. Thus, we resolve an open question that has been repeatedly, explicitly asked over …
Let $G$ be a bipartite graph where every node has a strict ranking of its neighbors. For every node, its preferences over neighbors extend naturally to preferences over matchings. Matching $N$ is more popular than matching $M$ if the number of nodes that prefer $N$ to $M$ is more than the number that prefer $M$ to $N$. A maximum matching $M$ in $G$ is a "popular max-matching" if there is no maximum matching in $G$ that is more popular than $M$. Such matchings are relevant in applications where the set of admissible solutions is the set of maximum matchings and we wish to find a best maximum ma…
We consider the max-size popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' in G such that the vertices that prefer M' to M outnumber those that prefer M to M'. We show it is NP-hard to compute a max-size popular matching in G. This is in contrast to the tractability of this problem in bipartite graphs where a max-size popular matching can be computed in linear time. We define a subclass of max-size popular matchings called strongly dominant matchings and show a linear time algorithm to solve the strongly …
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching problem in a roommates instance has been an open problem for several years and here we show it is NP-hard. A sub-class of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings has been well-studied in bipartite graphs. We show that the dominant matching problem in a roommates instance is also NP-hard and this is the case even when the instance admits a stabl…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict preference ordering over its neighbors. Each vertex has an upper quota and a lower quota denoting the maximum and minimum number of vertices that can be assigned to it from its neighborhood. In the many-to-many setting with two-sided lower quotas, informally, a critical matching is a matching which fulfils vertex lower quotas to the maximum possible extent. This is a…
The popular matching problem is of matching a set of applicants to a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, ranking a non-empty subset of posts in the order of preference, possibly with ties. A matching M is popular if there is no other matching M' such that more applicants prefer M' to M. We give the first NC algorithm to solve the popular matching problem without ties. We also give an NC algorithm that solves the maximum-cardinality popular matching problem. No NC or RNC algorithms were known for the matching problem in preference systems prior to this work. Moreover, we g…
Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular matchings are a well-studied generalization of stable matchings, introduced with the goal of enlarging the set of admissible solutions, while maintaining a certain level of fairness. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. Unfortunately, when there are edge costs, it is NP-hard to find a popular matching of minimum cost -- even worse, the min-cos…
In a graph where vertices have preferences over their neighbors, a matching is called popular if it does not lose a head-to-head election against any other matching when the vertices vote between the matchings. Popular matchings can be seen as an intermediate category between stable matchings and maximum-size matchings. In this paper, we aim to maximize the utility of a matching that is popular but admits only a few blocking edges. For general graphs already finding a popular matching with at most one blocking edge is NP-complete. For bipartite instances, we study the problem of finding a maxi…
In the popular edge problem, the input is a bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B,E)$ where $A$ and $B$ denote a set of men and a set of women respectively, and each vertex in $A\cup B$ has a strict preference ordering over its neighbours. A matching $M$ in $G$ is said to be {\em popular} if there is no other matching $M'$ such that the number of vertices that prefer $M'$ to $M$ is more than the number of vertices that prefer $M$ to $M'$. The goal is to determine, whether a given edge $e$ belongs to some popular matching in $G$. A polynomial-time algorithm for this problem appears in \cite{CK18}. We …
In this paper, we consider the problem of computing an optimal matching in a bipartite graph where elements of one side of the bipartition specify preferences over the other side, and one or both sides can have capacities and classifications. The input instance is a bipartite graph G=(A U P,E), where A is a set of applicants, P is a set of posts, and each applicant ranks its neighbors in an order of preference, possibly involving ties. Moreover, each vertex v in A U P has a quota q(v) denoting the maximum number of partners it can have in any allocation of applicants to posts - referred to as …
Given a bipartite graph, where the two sets of vertices are applicants and posts and ranks on the edges represent preferences of applicants over posts, a {\em rank-maximal} matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank one posts and subject to this condition, the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank two posts, and so on. We study the dynamic version of the problem in which a new applicant or post may be added to the graph and we would like to maintain a rank-maximal matching. We show that after the arrival of one vertex, we are always able …
Given a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m \geq n$ items, with each person having a list that ranks his/her preferred items in order of preference, we want to match every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is called popular if for any other matching $M'$, the number of people who prefer $M$ to $M'$ is not less than the number of those who prefer $M'$ to $M$. For given $n$ and $m$, consider the probability of existence of a popular matching when each person's preference list is independently and uniformly generated at random. Previously, Mahdian showed that when people's preferenc…
Popular matchings have been intensively studied recently as a relaxed concept of stable matchings. By applying the concept of popular matchings to branchings in directed graphs, Kavitha et al.\ (2020) introduced popular branchings. In a directed graph $G=(V_G,E_G)$, each vertex has preferences over its incoming edges. For branchings $B_1$ and $B_2$ in $G$, a vertex $v\in V_G$ prefers $B_1$ to $B_2$ if $v$ prefers its incoming edge of $B_1$ to that of $B_2$, where having an arbitrary incoming edge is preferred to having none, and $B_1$ is more popular than $B_2$ if the number of vertices that p…
We consider the problem of computing a matching in a bipartite graph in the presence of one-sided preferences. There are several well studied notions of optimality which include pareto optimality, rank maximality, fairness and popularity. In this paper, we conduct an in-depth experimental study comparing different notions of optimality based on a variety of metrics like cardinality, number of rank-1 edges, popularity, to name a few. Observing certain shortcomings in the standard notions of optimality, we propose an algorithm which maximizes an alternative metric called the Area under Profile C…
This paper makes three contributions to estimating the number of perfect matching in bipartite graphs. First, we prove that the popular sequential importance sampling algorithm works in polynomial time for dense bipartite graphs. More carefully, our algorithm gives a $(1\pmε)$-approximation for the number of perfect matchings of a $λ$-dense bipartite graph, using $O(n^{\frac{1-2λ}λε^{-2}})$ samples. With size $n$ on each side and for $\frac{1}{2}>λ>0$, a $λ$-dense bipartite graph has all degrees greater than $(λ+\frac{1}{2})n$. Second, practical applications of the algorithm require many calls…
