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arXiv 1301.0577cs.GTcs.AI
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具有有限影响的大种群博弈中的有效Nash计算

Efficient Nash Computation in Large Population Games with Bounded Influence

University of Pennsylvania(宾夕法尼亚大学);Tel Aviv University(特拉维夫大学)

Michael Kearns, Yishay Mansour

摘要:

本文介绍了大种群博弈的一种一般表示,其中每个博弈者对其他博弈者的影响是集中的和有限的,但在其他方面可能是任意的.这种表示以一种自然的方式显著地推广了拥塞博弈.我们的主要结果是在这种一般框架下计算和学习近似纳什均衡的可证明正确和有效的算法.

英文摘要:

We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS congestion games IN a natural way.Our main results are provably correct AND efficient algorithms FOR computing AND learning approximate Nash equilibria IN this general framework.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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