Many have proposed that free will would use quantum indeterminism. Strict adherence to the Born rule, which follows from the no-signal condition, seems to block this possibility. I propose here that if state collapse really does occur then there is a further form of indeterminism occurring in multipartite systems in that the basis upon which the collapse is to occur could be ambiguous. The choice of this basis is not covered by quantum mechanics nor subject to probability constraints and this provides a ground for a physical and eventually a mathematical model of free will.
Conway and Kochen's Free Will Theory is examined as an important foundational element in a new area of activity in computer science - developing protocols for quantum computing
In a recent series of papers and lectures, John Conway and Simon Kochen presented The Free Will Theorem. "It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small share of this valuable commodity." Perhaps the primary motivation of their papers was to place stringent constraints on quantum mechanical hidden variable theories, which they indeed do. Nevertheless, the notion of free will is crucial to the proof and they even speculate that the free will afforded to elementary particles is the ultimate explanation of our own free will. I …
This article has been written, in a slightly different version, as an introductory chapter for the book collecting the essays of theoretical physicist Gerard 't Hooft, philosopher Emanuele Severino, and theologian Piero Coda, and inspired by the talks the three authors made as keynote speakers at the conference "Determinism and Free Will", held at the Cariplo Foundation Congress Center in Milan on May 13, 2017.
Physics has long lived with a schizophrenia that desires determinism for measured systems while demanding that experimenters decide what to measure on a whim. Intriguingly, such a free will assumption for experimenters has thwarted many attempts to provide a satisfactory explanation of how quantum probabilities evolve to clear-cut measurements. An overview of this quantum measurement problem is presented without equations, and the lesson is drawn that denial of experimenters' free will may be the only workable solutions. If the free will assumption is rejected, then a door is open that may ult…
This article focuses on the connection between the possibility of quantum computers, the predictability of complex quantum systems in nature, and the issue of free will.
Before Alan Turing made his crucial contributions to the theory of computation, he studied the question of whether quantum mechanics could throw light on the nature of free will. This article investigates the roles of quantum mechanics and computation in free will. Although quantum mechanics implies that events are intrinsically unpredictable, the `pure stochasticity' of quantum mechanics adds only randomness to decision making processes, not freedom. By contrast, the theory of computation implies that even when our decisions arise from a completely deterministic decision-making process, the o…
Quantum Mechanics is generally considered to be the ultimate theory capable of explaining the emergence of randomness by virtue of the quantum measurement process. Therefore, Quantum Mechanics can be thought of as God's wonderfully imaginative solution to the problem of providing His creatures with Free Will in an otherwise well-ordered Universe. Indeed, how could we dream of free will in the purely deterministic Universe envisioned by Laplace if everything ever to happen is predetermined by (and in principle calculable from) the actual conditions or even those existing at the time of the Big …
Sibylgaze, Industry Intelligence GmbH（Sibylgaze工业智能有限公司）；Poornaprajna Institute of Scientific Research（普尔纳普拉吉纳科学研究所）
It is argued that the concept of free will, like the concept of truth in formal languages, requires a separation between an object level and a meta-level for being consistently defined. The Jamesian two-stage model, which deconstructs free will into the causally open "free" stage with its closure in the "will" stage, is implicitly a move in this direction. However, to avoid the dilemma of determinism, free will additionally requires an infinite regress of causal meta-stages, making free choice a hypertask. We use this model to define free will of the rationalist-compatibilist type. This is sho…
The basic question in the long-standing debate about free will (FW) is not whether FW can be demonstrated to exist nor even whether it exists, but instead how to define it scientifically. If FW is not dismissed as an illusion nor identified with a variety of unpredictability, then logical paradoxes arise that make FW elusive to define. We resolve these paradoxes through a model of FW, in which FW is a new causal primitive empowered to override physical causality under guidance. We develop a simple mathematical realization of this model, that when applied to quantum theory, suggests that the ex…
I wish to discuss a large, interwoven set of topics pointed at in the title above. Much of what I say is highly speculative, some is testable, some is, at present, surely not. It is, I hope, useful, to set these ideas forth for our consideration. What I shall say assumes quantum measurement is real, and that Bohm's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is not true. The Stalemate: In our contemporary neurobiology and much of the philosophy of mind post Descartes we are classical physics machines and either mindless, or mind is at best epiphenomenal and can have no consequences for the physical wo…
The problem of defining and locating free will (FW) in physics is studied. On basis of logical paradoxes, we argue that FW has a meta-theoretic character, like the concept of truth in Tarski's undefinability theorem. Free will exists relative to a base theory if there is freedom to deviate from the deterministic or indeterministic dynamics in the theory, with the deviations caused by parameters (representing will) in the meta-theory. By contrast, determinism and indeterminism do not require meta-theoretic considerations in their formalization, making FW a fundamentally new causal primitive. FW…
It is considered the study of determinism in the theories of physics. Based on fundamental postulates of physics, it is proved that the evolution of the universe is univocally determined, proving ultimately that free will does not exist. In addition, it is presented some contradictions and weaknesses of quantum mechanics, suggesting paradoxes in the theory. It is also analyzed some consequences of the postulates in justice and ethics.
The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind…
This paper argues for the following three theses: (1) There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are maximally rich in information and usually also maximally simple. (2) There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific system we can reasonably expect under ignorance of its exact initial conditions. This procedure works in the same manner for both classical and quantum physics. (3) There is no cogent reason to take the parameters …
We revisit the vexed question of how unpredictability can arise in a deterministic universe, focusing on unitary quantum theory. We discuss why quantum unpredictability is irrelevant for the possibility of what some people call `free-will', and why existing `free-will' arguments are themselves irrelevant to argue for or against a physical theory.
From what is known today about the elementary particles of matter, and the forces that control their behavior, it may be observed that still a host of obstacles must be overcome that are standing in the way of further progress of our understanding. Most researchers conclude that drastically new concepts must be investigated, new starting points are needed, older structures and theories, in spite of their successes, will have to be overthrown, and new, superintelligent questions will have to be asked and investigated. In short, they say that we shall need new physics. Here, we argue in a differ…
The basic problem posed by free will (FW) for physics appears to be not the \textit{physical} one of whether it is compatible with the laws of physics, but the \textit{logical} one of how to consistently define it, since it incorporates the contrary notions of freedom, which suggests indeterminism, as well as control, which bespeaks determinism. We argue that it must be a fundamentally new causal primitive, in addition to determinism and indeterminism. In particular, we identify FW in a physical theory with dynamics that is uncomputable, and hence effectively indeterministic within the theory.…
Can mathematics help us find our way through all the wonders and mysteries of the universe? When physicists describe the laws governing the physical world, mathematics is always involved. Is this due to the fact that the universe is, at least in part, mathematical? Or rather mathematics is merely a tool used by physicists to model phenomena? Is mathematics just a language to tell the story of our universe, a story which could be told with the same or even more effectiveness using another language? Or quite the opposite, the universe is just a mathematical structure?
Since Descartes' dualism, with his res extensa and res cogitans, six fundamental problems in the philosophy and natural history of mind are these: 1. how does mind act on matter? 2. If mind does not act on matter is mind a mere epiphenomenon? 3. What might be the source of free will? 4. What might be the source of a responsible free will? 5. Why might it have been selectively advantageous to evolve consciousness? 6. What is consciousness? I approach the first five of the above six problems based on two physical postulates. First the mind-brain system is a quantum coherent, but reversibly decoh…
