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arXiv 1202.1712cs.GT
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多结果和多维市场评分规则

Multi-outcome and Multidimensional Market Scoring Rules

Lance Fortnow, Rahul Sami

摘要:

汉森的市场评分规则使我们能够设计一个预测市场,即使我们有一个非流动性的市场,有限数量的非流动性约束的代理人,仍然提供有用的信息。每个代理都可以将市场的当前价格“移动”到他们的预测。虽然这种运动仍然发生在多结果或多维市场,我们表明,没有市场评分规则,在合理的条件下,总是移动的价格直接向代理人的信念。我们提出了一个修改后的版本的市场评分规则的限制交易者,并表明它确实有财产,从任何起始位置,最佳的贸易由限制交易者将导致市场走向交易者的真正信念。这种机制还保留了市场评分规则的几个有吸引力的战略属性。

英文摘要:

Hanson's market scoring rules allow us to design a prediction market that still gives useful information even if we have an illiquid market with a limited number of budget-constrained agents. Each agent can "move" the current price of a market towards their prediction. While this movement still occurs in multi-outcome or multidimensional markets we show that no market-scoring rule, under reasonable conditions, always moves the price directly towards beliefs of the agents. We present a modified version of a market scoring rule for budget-limited traders, and show that it does have the property that, from any starting position, optimal trade by a budget-limited trader will result in the market being moved towards the trader's true belief. This mechanism also retains several attractive strategic properties of the market scoring rule.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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