arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1111.2619cs.NI
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智能电网中数据聚合与访问控制的安全体系结构

A Security Architecture for Data Aggregation and Access Control in Smart Grids

Sushmita Ruj, Amiya Nayak, Ivan Stojmenovic

摘要:

我们提出了一个集成的架构,智能电网,支持数据聚合和访问控制。数据可以通过家庭区域网络、建筑区域网络和邻近区域网络进行聚合,从而保护客户的隐私。我们使用同态加密技术来实现这一点。收集的用户数据被发送到变电站,在那里由远程终端单元(RTU)进行监控。所提出的访问控制机制提供了选择性的访问消费者数据存储在数据库中,并使用不同的智能电网用户。用户可以是维护单位、公用事业中心、定价估算单位或分析和预测组。我们使用基于属性的加密技术解决了这个访问控制问题。RTU和用户具有由多个密钥分发中心(KDC)分发的属性和加密密钥。RTU发送在一组属性下加密的数据。只要用户具有有效的属性,他们就可以解密信息。访问控制方案本质上是分布式的,不依赖于单个KDC来分发密钥。Bobba \emph{et al.} \cite{BKAA09}提出了一种访问控制方案,该方案依赖于集中式KDC,因此容易出现单点故障。另一个要求是,在数据传输期间,KDC必须在线,这在我们的计划中是不需要的。我们的访问控制方案是抗合谋的,这意味着用户不能合谋,并获得访问数据,当他们没有被授权访问。我们从理论上分析我们的计划,并表明,计算开销是足够低的智能电网进行。据我们所知,我们是第一个工作的智能电网,它集成了这两个重要的安全组件(隐私保护数据聚合和访问控制),并提出了一个整体的安全架构在智能电网。

英文摘要:

We propose an integrated architecture for smart grids, that supports data aggregation and access control. Data can be aggregated by home area network, building area network and neighboring area network in such a way that the privacy of customers is protected. We use homomorphic encryption technique to achieve this. The consumer data that is collected is sent to the substations where it is monitored by remote terminal units (RTU). The proposed access control mechanism gives selective access to consumer data stored in data repositories and used by different smart grid users. Users can be maintenance units, utility centers, pricing estimator units or analyzing and prediction groups. We solve this problem of access control using cryptographic technique of attribute-based encryption. RTUs and users have attributes and cryptographic keys distributed by several key distribution centers (KDC). RTUs send data encrypted under a set of attributes. Users can decrypt information provided they have valid attributes. The access control scheme is distributed in nature and does not rely on a single KDC to distribute keys. Bobba \emph{et al.} \cite{BKAA09} proposed an access control scheme, which relies on a centralized KDC and is thus prone to single-point failure. The other requirement is that the KDC has to be online, during data transfer which is not required in our scheme. Our access control scheme is collusion resistant, meaning that users cannot collude and gain access to data, when they are not authorized to access. We theoretically analyze our schemes and show that the computation overheads are low enough to be carried out in smart grids. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work on smart grids, which integrates these two important security components (privacy preserving data aggregation and access control) and presents an overall security architecture in smart grids.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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