随机攻击和目标攻击下智能电网连锁故障分析
Analyzing Cascading Failures in Smart Grids under Random and Targeted Attacks
摘要：
我们将智能电网建模为复杂的相互依赖的网络，并首次研究了针对智能电网的攻击。智能电网由两个网络组成：电力网络和通信网络，通过边缘互连。在一个网络中发生故障（攻击）会触发另一个网络中的故障，并在整个网络中级联传播。这种级联故障可能导致网络中的任何一个（或两个）解体。早期的工程只考虑随机故障。在实际情况中，攻击者更有可能选择性地危害节点。我们研究了智能电网中的级联故障，攻击者有选择地以与其度成比例的概率损害节点;度高的节点以更高的概率受到损害。我们从数学上分析了网络在有针对性的攻击下的巨组件的大小，并将结果与随机攻击下的相应大小进行了比较。我们表明，网络瓦解更快的有针对性的攻击相比，随机攻击。对一小部分高度节点的有针对性的攻击会分解一个或两个网络，而这两个网络都包含对同一部分节点进行随机攻击的巨大组件。
英文摘要：
We model smart grids as complex interdependent networks, and study targeted attacks on smart grids for the first time. A smart grid consists of two networks: the power network and the communication network, interconnected by edges. Occurrence of failures (attacks) in one network triggers failures in the other network, and propagates in cascades across the networks. Such cascading failures can result in disintegration of either (or both) of the networks. Earlier works considered only random failures. In practical situations, an attacker is more likely to compromise nodes selectively. We study cascading failures in smart grids, where an attacker selectively compromises the nodes with probabilities proportional to their degrees; high degree nodes are compromised with higher probability. We mathematically analyze the sizes of the giant components of the networks under targeted attacks, and compare the results with the corresponding sizes under random attacks. We show that networks disintegrate faster for targeted attacks compared to random attacks. A targeted attack on a small fraction of high degree nodes disintegrates one or both of the networks, whereas both the networks contain giant components for random attack on the same fraction of nodes.
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