非价格接受者代理的市场机制
Market Mechanisms with Non-Price-Taking Agents
AI总结:
针对具有一般凹效用的非价格接受者代理,提出一种分散式资源分配机制,该机制在容量约束下实现预算平衡、个体理性并收敛到集中式问题的最优解。
摘要:
本文开发了一种分散式资源分配机制,用于将具有容量约束的可分割商品分配给具有一般凹效用的非价格接受者代理。所提出的机制始终预算平衡、个体理性,并收敛到相应集中式问题的最优解。这种机制在具有一般拓扑且无拍卖师的网络中非常有用,其中竞争代理/用户需要不同类型的服务。
英文摘要:
The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced, individually rational, and it converges to an optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem. Such a mechanism is very useful in a network with general topology and no auctioneer where the competitive agents/users want different type of services.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。