无线通信资源共享的干预博弈理论
The Theory of Intervention Games for Resource Sharing in Wireless Communications
摘要：
本文发展了一个博弈论框架的设计和分析一类新的激励计划称为干预计划。我们制定干预对策，提出了干预均衡的解决方案的概念，并证明了它的存在性在有限干预对策。我们将我们的框架应用于无线通信中的资源共享场景，其非合作的结果，而不干预产生次优性能。我们得出的分析结果，并分析说明性的例子中的情况下，不完善和完善的监测。在不完善的监测的情况下，干预方案可以改善非合作均衡的次优性能时，干预设备具有足够准确的监测技术，虽然它可能无法实现最佳可行的性能。在理想监测的情况下，当干预设备具有足够强的干预能力时，干预方案可以获得最佳可行性能。
英文摘要：
This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for the design and analysis of a new class of incentive schemes called intervention schemes. We formulate intervention games, propose a solution concept of intervention equilibrium, and prove its existence in a finite intervention game. We apply our framework to resource sharing scenarios in wireless communications, whose non-cooperative outcomes without intervention yield suboptimal performance. We derive analytical results and analyze illustrative examples in the cases of imperfect and perfect monitoring. In the case of imperfect monitoring, intervention schemes can improve the suboptimal performance of non-cooperative equilibrium when the intervention device has a sufficiently accurate monitoring technology, although it may not be possible to achieve the best feasible performance. In the case of perfect monitoring, the best feasible performance can be obtained with an intervention scheme when the intervention device has a sufficiently strong intervention capability.
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