基于贝叶斯干扰博弈的无线系统竞争
Competition in Wireless Systems via Bayesian Interference Games
摘要：
我们研究无线设备之间的竞争与不完整的信息，他们的对手。我们将这种相互作用建模为贝叶斯干扰博弈。每个无线设备在整个可用带宽上选择功率简档以最大化其数据率。这样的竞争模型代表了几个无线设备共享频谱而没有任何中央机构或协调协议的情况。与设备拥有对手完整信息的游戏相比，我们考虑的场景是设备不知道它们对其他设备造成的干扰。这种游戏，这是建模为贝叶斯游戏，可以表现出显着不同的均衡。我们首先考虑一个简单的情况下，同时移动游戏，我们表明，独特的贝叶斯-纳什均衡是两个设备在整个带宽上均匀分布其功率。然后，我们将此模型扩展到一个两层的频谱共享的情况下，用户按顺序行事。这里，其中一个设备（称为主用户）是频谱的所有者，它首先选择其功率配置文件。然后，第二个设备（称为次要用户）通过选择功率简档以最大化其香农容量来做出响应。在这样的顺序移动游戏中，我们表明，存在的主要用户获得更高的数据率通过使用仅一部分的带宽的均衡。在一个重复的贝叶斯干扰博弈中，我们证明了声誉效应的存在：一个知情的主用户可以虚张声势，以防止频谱使用的次要用户谁遭受缺乏信息的信道增益。由此产生的均衡可能是非常低效的，这表明竞争性频谱共享是非常次优的。
英文摘要：
We study competition between wireless devices with incomplete information about their opponents. We model such interactions as Bayesian interference games. Each wireless device selects a power profile over the entire available bandwidth to maximize its data rate. Such competitive models represent situations in which several wireless devices share spectrum without any central authority or coordinated protocol. In contrast to games where devices have complete information about their opponents, we consider scenarios where the devices are unaware of the interference they cause to other devices. Such games, which are modeled as Bayesian games, can exhibit significantly different equilibria. We first consider a simple scenario of simultaneous move games, where we show that the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium is where both devices spread their power equally across the entire bandwidth. We then extend this model to a two-tiered spectrum sharing case where users act sequentially. Here one of the devices, called the primary user, is the owner of the spectrum and it selects its power profile first. The second device (called the secondary user) then responds by choosing a power profile to maximize its Shannon capacity. In such sequential move games, we show that there exist equilibria in which the primary user obtains a higher data rate by using only a part of the bandwidth. In a repeated Bayesian interference game, we show the existence of reputation effects: an informed primary user can bluff to prevent spectrum usage by a secondary user who suffers from lack of information about the channel gains. The resulting equilibrium can be highly inefficient, suggesting that competitive spectrum sharing is highly suboptimal.
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