无线供应商对原子用户的竞争
Competition of Wireless Providers for Atomic Users
摘要：
我们研究的问题，无线服务提供商竞争异构无线用户。用户的效用函数以及对各个提供者的服务质量的感知不同。我们将任意数量的供应商和用户的交互建模为两阶段多领导者-追随者博弈。我们证明了一个通用的信道模型和一个广泛的用户的效用函数的子博弈完美纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性。我们表明，资源提供商的竞争导致一个全球最优的结果在温和的技术条件下。在唯一子博弈完美均衡下，大多数用户只会从一个供应商那里购买资源。在均衡时，连接到多个提供商的用户数量总是小于提供商的数量。我们还提出了一个分散的算法，全局收敛到唯一的系统平衡，只有局部信息的更新率在温和的条件下。
英文摘要：
We study a problem where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their utility functions as well as in the perceived quality of service of individual providers. We model the interaction of an arbitrary number of providers and users as a two-stage multi-leader-follower game. We prove existence and uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for a generic channel model and a wide class of users' utility functions. We show that the competition of resource providers leads to a globally optimal outcome under mild technical conditions. Most users will purchase the resource from only one provider at the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. The number of users who connect to multiple providers at the equilibrium is always smaller than the number of providers. We also present a decentralized algorithm that globally converges to the unique system equilibrium with only local information under mild conditions on the update rates.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
