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arXiv 0910.4618cs.NIcs.GT
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P2P网络中内容生产与共享激励的博弈分析

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks

Jaeok Park, Mihaela van der Schaar

摘要:

用户生成的内容可以使用对等(P2P)网络以低成本分发,但搭便车问题阻碍了P2P网络的利用。为了实现P2P网络的有效利用,我们调查的基本问题,激励内容的生产和共享,利用博弈论。我们建立了一个基本模型来分析非合作的结果,没有一个激励计划,然后使用不同的游戏配方从基本模型来检查五个激励计划:合作,支付,重复互动,干预,并强制充分共享。研究结果表明:1)合作节点共享所有产生的内容,而非合作节点在没有激励机制的情况下根本不共享; 2)合作机制允许节点消费比非合作结果更多的内容; 3)通过引入基于付费、重复交互或干预的激励机制,非合作节点之间可以实现合作结果; 4)强制完全共享对同伴的福利影响不明确。除了描述不同配方的解决方案,我们讨论了执行和信息的要求,以实现每个解决方案,旨在为协议设计者提供一个指导方针时,设计P2P网络的激励计划。

英文摘要:

User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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